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The ability to remember has been described as one of the most important cognitive 
functions, largely because it is evolutionarily optimal to be able to retain information 
relevant to survival. Autobiographical memory, which is defined as one’s memory for 
their own experiences, is especially paramount as it contributes to self-identity and the 
ability to learn from past experiences. The current study investigated the brain activation 
associated with different types of social feedback on autobiographical memory through 
the use of Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS). Seventeen undergraduate 
participants were presented with video- and audio-recorded scenes of an actress 
performing everyday tasks. One week later, they were given either confirmatory or 
disconfirmatory social feedback regarding the accuracy and occurrence of their memories 
whilst their left prefrontal cortical brain activity was recorded using fNIRS. It was found 
that on average, participants’ brain activity differed dependent upon whether the feedback 
was about scene details or scene occurrence, and upon whether the feedback was 
confirmatory or disconfirmatory. It was also found that participants who maintained, 
relinquished, or partially relinquished their belief in their memory had distinct patterns of 
cortical activity. This study was the first to use a functional neuroimaging paradigm to 
investigate the dissociation between one’s appraisals of belief in accuracy and 
occurrence, demonstrating that they are neurologically distinct metamemorial appraisals. 
Thus, these findings reinforce the uniqueness of decision-making about memory in 
general, highlighting the continued need for research investigating the appraisals 
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Linking the Past to the Future through Memory 
 Remembering is described by Bartlett (1932) as a reconstruction of our own 
imagination, stemming from the relationship between our attitudes and our organized past 
experiences. The ability to remember allows us to essentially “re-experience” events that 
may or may not be pertinent to our life stories. For example, most people can look fondly 
upon the memory of their high school graduation, or their first time riding a bike. 
However, there are instances in which remembering can be disrupted, disjointed, or 
otherwise departed. In the classic case of Henry Molaison (famously known as HM), the 
removal of the hippocampi within his medial temporal lobes resulted in a devastating 
condition known as anterograde amnesia, which is the inability to form new memories 
(Scoville & Milner, 1957). Any type of memory loss can be especially calamitous 
because evolutionarily, our memory systems have been optimized to process and retain 
fitness-relevant information, which allows us the ability to make decisions that can 
benefit us in the future (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2016). For these reasons, memories are 
much like “time capsules”, used to recount the past and to teach lessons for the future 
(Rubin, 1988). In other words, by remembering the things that have happened to us, we 
subsequently shape our future thoughts, goals, and actions.  
 The Basic Systems Model of Memory (Rubin, 2006) suggests that the mind and 
brain are separated into several basic systems, and that separate systems for each of the 
senses, spatial imagery, language, emotion, narrative, and motor output exist. Rubin 




multiple different metamemory processes are used to assemble one’s experience of 
remembering. In this model, two specific appraisals are discussed and have been 
established as being important for remembering what has happened in the past: belief, 
which refers to the degree to which one’s perception of an event corresponds to the way 
that it was truly experienced, and recollection, which is described as the presence of a 
vivid mental representation, including a sense of re-experiencing of an event. 
Recollection and belief are considered to be important metacognitive judgements based 
on their high level of processing in each of the basic systems (spatial imagery, language, 
emotion, narrative, and motor output).  
Autobiographical Remembering 
 One important form of memory is autobiographical memory, which refers to the 
memories that a person has of their own life experiences (Rubin, 1988). This type of 
memory plays a fundamental role in the development and maintenance of one’s self 
concept because it helps define who we are, and it ties us to our own personal histories 
(Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 2001). The language used to describe this form of memory has 
been widely disputed and it has past been referred to with terms such as “suddenly 
remembering” (Munsat, 1967), and “personal memory” (Locke, 1971). The meaning of 
the term “autobiographical memory” has been quite controversial, with some referring to 
it as a form of episodic memory (Kopelman & Kapur, 2001; Rubin, 1998) and others 
placing more emphasis on the importance of retaining knowledge about oneself to pursue 
and achieve personal goals (Conway & Pleydell-Pierce, 2000).  
 Brewer (1986; 1995) prefers to use the term recollective memories, which he 




their own past. Brewer (1986) organizes recollective memories into four autobiographical 
groups based on their acquisition conditions (single instance or repeated instance) and 
their form of representation (imaginal or non-imaginal). First, a personal memory, is a 
phenomenally experienced (i.e., perceptible by use of the senses or through immediate 
experience) product of a single episode (e.g., I went rollerblading at Lakewood park on 
Tuesday). Second, an autobiographical fact, is a non-phenomenally experienced product 
of a single episode (e.g., I can recall that I went rollerblading on Tuesday). Third, a 
generic personal memory, is a phenomenally experienced product of multiple episodes 
(e.g., I have an image of myself rollerblading in an [unspecified] park in an [unspecified] 
area of town). Finally, one forms their self-schema using the non-phenomenally 
experienced product of multiple episodes (e.g. I am someone who likes to rollerblade).  
 Autobiographical memory includes a rich database of knowledge about oneself, 
which makes it difficult to pinpoint a precise definition for it (Holland & Kensinger, 
2010). This is largely because of Tulving (1972; 1983) who suggests that 
autobiographical memory is divided into both episodic and semantic memory systems, 
encompassing personal semantic information (e.g., facts about oneself, such as knowing 
the date of your birthday), and personal episodic information (e.g., unique events, such as 
remembering your high school graduation). Interestingly, recalling personal semantic 
information does not depend on retrieving specific experiences, but rather is linked to 
feelings of familiarity. Personal episodic memory is recalled quite differently, requiring a 
sense of re-experiencing and the recollection of particular past events (Wheeler, Stuss, & 




 Greenberg and Rubin (2003) also provide a comprehensive definition of 
autobiographical memory, postulating that the term refers to memories that have several 
properties: first, they state that autobiographical memory and episodic memory are 
similar because they both receive and store information that is temporally dated, and is 
about specific events that have a temporal-spatial relation among them (Tulving, 1983). 
Second, they highlight that autobiographical memories involve more than just the 
retrieval of stored data. As described by Tulving (1985), the rememberer must be 
conscious of their prior conscious experience, a phenomenon known as autonoetic 
consciousness. This autonoetic consciousness is a necessary but insufficient quality that 
contributes to a memory being categorized as an autobiographical memory. The accounts 
of philosophers (Brewer, 1995) and of amnesiacs (Crovitz, 1986) suggest that 
autobiographical memories should be accompanied by a belief that the event occurred, as 
well as experiences of reliving the event (Greenberg & Rubin, 2003). Therefore, 
according to Greenberg and Rubin (2003), a memory of a personally experienced event 
that stems from a sense of recollection or reliving is termed an autobiographical memory.  
Memories can be Altered 
 There is a large body of research that suggests that memories are dynamic 
reconstructions of the past, making them susceptible to change (Neisser, 1996; Wright & 
Loftus, 1998). Because of this, the ability to remember things that have happened can be 
both a blessing and a curse. Memory allows us to remember the things that are most 
important, but it cannot always be trusted. The misinformation effect refers to an 
impairment in one’s memory for the past that occurs when they have been exposed to 




memory has addressed many of the questions surrounding this phenomenon (Loftus, 
2005). First, we know that people are particularly prone to having their memories 
affected by misinformation if it is introduced after the passage of time (Loftus, Miller, & 
Burns, 1978). This is because it is possible that the memory has faded, and therefore it is 
less likely that a discrepancy will be noticed. Second, it has been demonstrated that the 
misinformation effect influences the memory of some people more than others. 
Individual factors such as age (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Karpel, Hoyer, & Toglia, 2001; 
Davis & Loftus, 2005), and certain personality characteristics such as empathy (Wright & 
Livingston-Raper, 2002) play a prominent role in whether a person will fall prey to the 
misinformation effect.  
 The misinformation effect postulates that new information can be added to 
existing memories due to post-event influences. Loftus and Palmer (1974) presented their 
participants with videos of automobile accidents and they instructed them to answer 
questions such as “about how fast were the cars going when they smashed into each 
other?”. This particular question suggests that the cars must have been going quite fast, 
and when participants were administered a memory test one week later, the participants 
who were given the verb smashed (others were given words such as bumped or collided) 
were more likely to answer “yes” to the question “did you see any broken glass?” when 
there was in fact, no broken glass. In this experiment, the introduction of the word 
"smashed" provided the participants with new information that was then incorporated 
into the original memory for the scene. When this happens, the participant now has a 




demonstrating that new and/or false information can be introduced into a person’s 
memory. 
 In another classic study, Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978) found that information 
obtained after an event can do more than just supplement or add to your memory; it can 
alter it completely. Participants were again shown a series of slides depicting an 
automobile accident, this time involving a pedestrian. Immediately after viewing the 
slides, participants answered a series of questions. Half were asked “did another car pass 
the red Datsun while it was stopped at the stop sign?”, and the other half were asked the 
same question about a yield sign. All participants then completed a memory test in which 
fifteen pairs of slides were presented and were asked to choose the slide that they had 
seen earlier. The most critical pair of slides showed the red Datsun coming to a stop at a 
stop sign, and an identical slide depicting the Datsun at a yield sign. The results of this 
study demonstrated that the misleading information (the intervening question described 
above) produced less accurate responding (e.g., participants were more likely to choose 
the option that the leading question had contained). These findings demonstrate that the 
information that a witness is exposed to after an event, whether it is consistent or 
misleading, can transform that witness’ memory of the event.   
 Interestingly, Zaragoza and Lane (1994) took a different approach in their 
exploration of the misinformation effect. In their study, they were interested in 
determining whether people confuse their misleading suggestions for “real” memories of 
a witnessed event, or if they just accept what others have told them as being true without 
any personal recollection; a phenomenon known as the source misattribution effect. The 




that they remembered seeing suggested items (that were never actually presented to 
them). Following the work of Zaragoza and Lane, Hyman (1999) clarified the three 
cognitive processes required for the creation of these false memories: (1) acceptance of 
the suggested information/event as plausible, (2) the creation of related imagery or 
narrative, and (3) error(s) in source-monitoring. To elaborate, first, an event must be 
plausible for it to be accepted as a possible memory. Next, one must have formed an 
image or narrative of the event. And finally, a source monitoring error, where the 
individual fails to recognize the source of the memory, must be made. This means that a 
person may believe an event to be plausible but may not think the event is an actual 
memory. Hyman (1999) highlights that having clear images and a greater level of affect 
and self-involvement helps to increase the chance that a suggested or discounted memory 
will be deemed as legitimate.  
 In everyday life, this phenomenon can occur when individuals who experience an 
event together later discuss what happened to them. Wagenaar and Crombag (2005) 
introduced the term collaborative storytelling, which represents the mutual reinforcement 
of ideas, that can occur when people attempt to collaboratively judge uncertain 
information. They presented a legal case where they proposed that when eyewitnesses 
were asked about their memory for an event that could not be verified by direct 
observation, they would tend to base their uncertainty upon the judgements of others. The 
authors relate this finding to the aforementioned study by Loftus, Miller, and Burns 
(1978) whereby information that a witness is exposed to after an event gets incorporated 




misinformation acceptance leads to a high degree of conviction about the new memories, 
making it more believable.  
 This phenomenon has also been studied in university students. Hyman, Husband, 
and Billings (1995) were interested in determining whether university students create 
false memories of childhood experiences in response to misleading questions and the 
demands of an interview. In their first experiment, they provided their subjects with 
descriptions of events that had allegedly occurred during the students’ childhood. They 
found that 20% of the students agreed that these events occurred, later freely recalling the 
event with the misinformation included in their rendition of the memory. A second 
experiment used less likely events such as spilling punch on the parents of the bride at a 
childhood wedding. This protocol also employed an extra interview, and increased 
conformity demands. The results indicated that 25% of the students produced a false 
recall. Taken together, this study illustrates that some individuals create false memories, 
and those who discuss related background knowledge during the early interviews are 
more likely to create a false recollection. The authors suggest that incorporation of 
information about remembered events in response to the social context may be a general 
phenomenon. In other words, when people engage in memory discussions with others, 
those around them may present differing views, memories, and reactions; calling into 
question their own memory for the event. 
 Although memory can be transformed due to post-event influences, there are 
instances in which people resist feedback from others. In one study, researchers examined 
“disputed memories”, which differ from the memory errors previously described in that 




Rubin, 2001). This was investigated in twins who disagreed about who ‘owns’ a certain 
autobiographical memory. For example, one disputed memory was described as “I (not 
my sister) ran into a clothesline and cut my head”. It was determined that disputed 
memories are a stable and reliable memory error, and that they occur frequently among 
twins who spend a great deal of time together. Moreover, the twins in this study were un-
willing to give up their autobiographical memories and considered them to be true 
accounts of past experiences even when they were presented with contrary evidence from 
the other twin. In this case, the dissonance (i.e., mental discomfort) that results from 
receiving discordant information from a trusted individual is relieved because of the un-
willingness to relinquish the memory.  
Cognitive Dissonance 
 Festinger (1957) proposed that humans strive for internal psychological 
consistency because it allows us to function well mentally. When people receive 
information that is inconsistent or discordant from what they believe to be true, cognitive 
discomfort, or dissonance, is experienced. Dissonance may arise from within a social 
group when an individual’s memory for an event is challenged by another person. 
Festinger (1957) examined how holding thoughts that are inconsistent with one another 
creates a “mental discomfort” that causes us to act in order to relieve this discomfort. He 
suggests that we may resolve this discomfort caused by holding inconsistencies in one of 
three ways: (a) by changing one of the discordant thoughts/beliefs, (b) by changing the 
behavior that is related to the inconsistency, or (c) by adding new thoughts which allow 
us to rationalize the inconsistency. For example, drinking alcohol is something that many 




cognitive dissonance that arises from these conflicting thoughts, one must resolve the 
inconsistencies. This can be done as Festinger (1957) suggests, by changing one of the 
thoughts/beliefs. One may think “alcohol isn’t that bad for you”, which would change 
one of the cognitions as a way of restoring consistency. Cognitive dissonance could also 
be reduced by changing the behaviour that is related to the inconsistency, by refusing to 
consume the alcoholic beverages, or consuming alcohol only once in a while. Finally, one 
could also add a thought, such as “alcohol is bad for you, but I exercise and eat healthy so 
it’s okay”, allowing them to rationalize the inconsistency.  
 In a recent study by Korcsog et al. (In Preparation), it was found that when 
receiving social feedback about actions performed in the lab, disconfirmatory feedback 
elicits cognitive dissonance. Undergraduate students were asked to either perform, 
imagine, or listen to a prompt for a series of 120 actions. One week later, the students 
rated their belief in the occurrence, vividness, and visual experience of their memory for 
90 actions. The researcher then gave feedback about the participant’s memory for 12 
actions, 6 of which were instances of disconfirmatory feedback (i.e., “You said 
performed, that is incorrect. You imagined this action.” Or “You said imagined, that is 
incorrect. You heard this action.”). It was found that the disagreement between the 
researcher and the participant on the source of an event elicits cognitive dissonance in the 
participant. This cognitive dissonance was assessed using Matz and Wood’s (2005) 
Emotion Measure, whereby a heightened score on questions asking if a person is feeling 
“uneasy”, “uncomfortable”, and “tense” represents dissonance discomfort. Van Veen and 
colleagues (2009) have shown using fMRI that when experiencing cognitive dissonance, 




magnitude of the activation of these two structures in turn predicts the subsequent attitude 
change. 
A Social-Cognitive Model of Memory 
 This brings into question the distinct underlying social-cognitive processes that 
come into play when receiving feedback about memory. Scoboria and Henkel (2020) 
outline a social-cognitive model of memory, the SCOboria Social-Cognitive Dissonance 
Model of Challenges to Memory, which explains the processing of cognitive dissonance 
that results when a person is told that their vivid memory did not actually occur in the 
past. This model posits that when we receive social feedback that invalidates the 
occurrence of remembered events, both intrapersonal and interpersonal cognitive 
dissonance results. When processing intrapersonal cognitive dissonance, we tend to 
weigh our own memory representation against the qualities of the feedback that has been 
given (such as whether the feedback is plausible). When processing interpersonal 
cognitive dissonance, we tend to weigh the potential costs and benefits of agreeing or 
disagreeing with the feedback provider (e.g., will disagreeing with this person negatively 
affect the relationship?). We are most often motivated to resolve both forms of 
dissonance. Scoboria and Henkel (2020) suggest that in order to resolve dissonance, one 
must evaluate the original memory, evaluate the social feedback, and then weigh the 
potential costs and benefits of responding in the context of the relationship. Only then can 
we either choose to maintain or reduce our belief in the occurrence of the event, and 
choose to agree with, disagree with, or to not communicate this decision about belief in 
occurrence to the challenger. Four outcomes may arise from this model: compliance, 





Figure 1. Scoboria and Henkel’s (2020) social-cognitive model of memory. When an 
individual receives social feedback from a challenger that a memory that they currently 
believe to be true did not occur, this results in 1) intrapersonal dissonance and 2) 
interpersonal dissonance. Intrapersonal dissonance is processed by evaluating the 
qualities of the feedback against the qualities of the memory, resulting in the decision to 
maintain or decrease belief in occurrence for the event. Interpersonal dissonance is 
processed by evaluating the costs and benefits of agreeing or disagreeing with the other 
person about the memory. Crossing these dimensions results in four possible outcomes 
for the memory (bottom right). 
 
Belief in Occurrence 
 When an event is remembered, the re-perception or recollection is not the only 




past. It is important to note however, that the presence of a recollection does not always 
mean that belief in the event exists (Scoboria et al., 2014). The term belief in occurrence 
(or autobiographical belief) is defined as the level of truth attributed to the occurrence of 
an event, whether or not that event is truly recollected (Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 
2010; Scoboria et al., 2004). Scoboria et al. (2004) postulate that plausibility, belief, and 
memory are nested constructs that are related to the perceived occurrence of an 
autobiographical event. This is because, in most cases, if a person remembers an event, 
they believe that it truly occurred in the past, and it will be regarded as plausible. For 
example, research looking at false confessions conducted by Gudjonsson (2003), asserts 
that when people confess to crimes that they did not actually commit, the first step in 
confessing is determining that they could have plausibly committed the crime.  
 Sometimes people report vivid memories that they still recollect, but no longer 
believe occurred to them; these memories are known as nonbelieved memories. Mazzoni, 
Scoboria, and Harvey (2010) conducted the first empirical study of nonbelieved 
memories, finding that approximately 20% of their sample reported having at least one 
nonbelieved memory and that nonbelieved memories share many of the recollective 
qualities that believed memories do. A recent study by Otgaar and colleagues (2019) 
examined The False Memory Archive, a unique art collection that contains hundreds of 
false memory reports, and found that of 500 submissions, 53.4% were nonbelieved 
memories. According to Mazzoni, Scoboria, and Harvey (2010), one characteristic that is 
uniquely associated with nonbelieved memories is the surprising intensity of negative 
emotions. The authors suggest that this may be due to the nature of the remembered 




also note that nonbelieved memories seem to be less personal and less connected to one’s 
self-concept than memories for events that have never been doubted, likely due to having 
less personal significance.  
Belief in Accuracy 
 The term belief in accuracy refers to the degree to which an event is believed to 
have occurred in the way it was recalled; that the details that come to mind correspond to 
the details that were present when the event was experienced (Scoboria, Talarico, & 
Pascal, 2015). As we now know, one characteristic of autobiographical memory is that it 
can often be influenced by social input from others, and that our memory for the details 
of an event can become quite fuzzy (Echterhoff & Hirst, 2009). It has been demonstrated 
that when participants discuss past events with a confederate, they are much more likely 
to incorporate the confederate’s recollection of the details of an event into their own 
memory (Merckelbach, van Roermund, & Candel, 2006). Studies also show that it is 
more likely that an incorrect detail will be implanted than it is to remove a correct detail 
(Loftus, Levidow, and Duensing, 1992). This is because attempting to remove a correct 
detail from someone’s memory requires misinformation that would contradict their prior 
recollections. Inserting an incorrect detail can be done with misinformation that is 
consistent with the scene itself, making it more plausible that the person could have just 
missed that detail during the original encoding of the event in question. 
 Misinformation that stems from when a participant is accompanied by a 
confederate can erase certain details from within memory reports (Wright et al., 2001; 
Gabbert et al., 2006). The person may also decide to withhold the reporting of certain 




due to the social pressure of the situation. This subsequently allows the feedback that has 
been given by the confederate to affect their memory for the details of the event. Gabbert 
et al. (2006) and Wright et al. (2001) both agree that when one is recounting the details of 
a scene by free-recall and another person suggests erroneous details and/or denies correct 
details, this seems to be able to alter memory reports in a similar way.  
Distinguishing Subtypes of Metamemory Beliefs 
 Brewer (1996) defines autobiographical remembering as being comprised of 
multiple metamemorial components. First, he states that a memory image (recollection) 
must be present. Second, he states that one must believe that the event occurred in the 
past (autobiographical belief/belief in occurrence). Finally, one must possess confidence 
that the details recalled accurately represent what has occurred in the past (belief in 
accuracy). Belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy ratings are largely synonymous in 
the literature, this is because spontaneous generation and laboratory experiments will 
typically elicit memories for events that are vividly recollected, are believed to have 
occurred, and are viewed to be accurate (Scoboria & Talarico, 2013). Scoboria, Talarico, 
and Pascal (2015) describe this as being because research investigating belief in 
occurrence and belief in accuracy tend to elicit memories for which both co-occur at high 
levels.  
 In their investigation of the subtypes of nonbelieved memories, Scoboria, Nash, 
and Mazzoni (2017) discovered several types of memories that participants rated belief in 
accuracy and belief in occurrence similarly, including “weak nonbelieved memories” 
(manipulations that question the recollective qualities of the memories), “grain-of-doubt 




memory), and of course, believed memories. They discuss that the objective plausibility 
of events and social influence interact with other characteristics when determining the 
level of belief in accuracy for nonbelieved memories, which is why it may have been 
rated similarly to belief in occurrence in the “weak nonbelieved memories” and “grain-
of-doubt nonbelieved memories” categories.  
Belief in Accuracy and Belief in Occurrence are Distinct 
 It has recently been suggested that belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and 
recollection are theoretically distinct aspects of autobiographical remembering. In one 
study by Scoboria, Talarico, and Pascal (2015), it was newly established that belief in 
accuracy and belief in occurrence may be distinct metamemorial processes. The authors 
found that each emerged as a distinct latent variable in their confirmatory modelling 
process. This distinction suggests that it is possible to edit the details within a memory 
without altering the overarching autobiographical belief appraisals. Korcsog (2017) 
attempted to further investigate this distinction, using simple scenes of an actress 
performing everyday tasks (e.g., making a sandwich). With the goal of further 
demonstrating the distinction between belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy in a 
controlled experimental setting, the researchers provided participants with feedback about 
their memory that was either confirmatory or disconfirmatory towards memory accuracy 
and occurrence. When participants were given negative feedback about belief in 
occurrence and positive feedback about the accuracy of their recollection, a decrease in 
belief in occurrence ratings emerged and there was no change in belief in accuracy 




 As one of the first studies to attempt to separate these constructs experimentally, 
Korcsog’s (2017) results elucidated an unexpected artifact whereby the feedback about 
belief in occurrence was targeting source monitoring rather than belief in occurrence. 
This was because, instead of telling the participant that they had not been presented with 
a scene (that they had in fact seen), they told participants that they had actually heard the 
scene (rather than having watched it as a video), creating source monitoring confusion 
between visual and auditory stimuli. Recently, this flaw has been addressed and 
corrected. Korcsog et al. (In Preparation) found that when participants receive 
disconfirmatory feedback about scene occurrence (“you were incorrect in saying that a 
scene of a girl __ was presented in session 1”), belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence 
scores both decrease. When participants receive disconfirmatory feedback about the 
accuracy of their memory for scenes (“you remembered less than 50% of the details 
correctly”), belief in occurrence ratings remained the same, but belief in accuracy scores 
decreased. These findings demonstrate a partial dissociation between belief in occurrence 
and belief in accuracy, suggesting that they are nested constructs. It is suggested that 
belief in occurrence may act as an overarching construct, since in this experiment, having 
belief in the accuracy of memory depended on having belief in the occurrence of it.  
 Believing that you are accurate about your memory is often thought to go hand-
in-hand with believing that the remembered event occurred, however as previously 
discussed, it has been shown that it is possible to possess a strong recollection of an event 
but not believe that the event occurred. Similarly, it is also possible to possess strong 
belief that a scene is recalled correctly in the absence of a belief that it occurred. For 




(defined as having low belief ratings and high recollection ratings) in which belief in 
accuracy remained high, encompassing cases such as “borrowed memories”. In these 
cases, a person recalls an event and can corroborate the details, yet also discovers that 
they had not truly been present and had instead learned the details from another person.  
 The phenomenon of borrowed memories was also studied by Korcsog (2018), in 
which the author endeavored to separate belief in accuracy ratings from belief in 
occurrence ratings. To do this, participants were provided with feedback about their 
memory for certain central details within scenes of an actress performing simple tasks 
(the same scenes as in Korcsog (2017) and as in the current study). This was done with 
the goal of isolating and affecting only the participant’s belief in the accuracy appraisals 
of their memory (while not affecting their belief in occurrence appraisals of the scene). 
What was found was that when participants received disconfirmatory feedback about the 
accuracy of their memory, the change in accuracy ratings was significantly greater than 
their belief in occurrence ratings, again demonstrating a distinction between the two 
appraisals. This is not surprising considering that one can believe that certain aspects of 
their memory are incorrect, but can still believe that the memory occurred, similar to 
believed-not-remembered memories described by Mazzoni, Scoboria, and Harvey (2010).  
 Using a similar approach, Otgaar et al. (2018) examined the impact of social 
feedback and objective false evidence on participants’ belief in occurrence, belief in 
accuracy, and recollection. In this study, participants underwent a virtual reality 
experience in which they were shown six different virtual reality scenes and were then 
given a memory test asking about belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and 




the lab and were either suggestively told that one of the events was not experienced, 
received objective false evidence that the event did not occur, a combination of both, or 
received nothing. The findings suggest that these manipulations predominantly decreased 
participants’ belief in occurrence, demonstrating that belief in occurrence is more 
receptive to social demands than belief in accuracy or recollection, further distinguishing 
the three. 
Autobiographical Memory in the Brain 
 Similar to investigations aimed at distinguishing memory processes using reports 
of past events, neuroscientists are also tasked with determining the form and function of 
brain structures involved in various memory processes. One of the most well-known 
findings in the area of neuroscience is that damage to the medial temporal lobes and 
hippocampus result in impaired memory processes (Scoville & Milner, 1957). This and 
subsequent studies lead to the understanding that episodic memories are neurologically 
dissociable from short-term and working memory (Moscovitch et al., 2016). Importantly, 
Jacobsen (1936) demonstrated that the prefrontal cortex also plays a significant role in 
working memory. In his study, the pre- and post-operative records of monkeys who had 
underwent bilateral and unilateral ablation of the prefrontal cortex were examined. He 
found that after bilateral ablation of the frontal association areas, the monkey would 
experience a permanent loss of capacity for working memory.  
 The prefrontal cortex is also proposed to be one of the major areas of the brain 
that are involved in specific components of autobiographical memory. Miller and Cohen 
(2001) describe the prefrontal cortex as being able to coordinate distributed brain activity 




general, top-down, cognitive control processes. Milner and Petridas (1984) investigated 
the effects of focal prefrontal cortical lesions on tests of long-term contextual memory 
and found that these lesions resulted in reduced output on fluency tasks, poor regulation 
of behaviour of external cues, impaired organization, poor monitoring of materials that 
were to be remembered, and decreased responses to stimuli. 
  In his work on the Basic Systems Model of Memory, Rubin (2006) described that 
when recalling autobiographical memories, several areas of the brain are active. He states 
that there is activity in the explicit memory system, referencing Addis et al. (2004) who 
found that when participants retrieve specific autobiographical memories, the associated 
activation is in regions involved in imagery in episodic memory such as the left 
precuneus, the left superior parietal lobule, and the right cuneus. Rubin (2006) then 
highlights the search-and-retrieval system, referencing Conway et al. (1999) who found 
that the left frontal cortex (as well as the left inferior temporal and occipital lobes) was 
active during the retrieval of autobiographical memories. They suggest that left frontal 
activation during the retrieval of autobiographical memories reflects the operation of 
control processes that are used to modulate the construction of autobiographical 
memories in the posterior neocortical pathways. Next, Rubin (2006) outlines the 
importance of the visual and spatial system in the recollection of autobiographical 
memories, referencing Addis et al., (2004) who state that specific autobiographical 
memories are composed of visual and contextual information, therefore rely on regions 
such as the precuneus and the parietal regions. Finally, Rubin (2006) highlights the 
emotion system as playing a role in memory, referring to the work of Greenberg et al. 




active during autobiographical retrieval but not semantic retrieval of memory. This 
suggests that the emotional component of autobiographical memory is tied to these brain 
regions.  
 Svoboda, McKinnon, and Levine (2006) provide a comprehensive meta-analysis 
of studies investigating autobiographical memory in the brain. Existing theories of 
memory and the findings summarized in their article suggest that the left-prefrontal 
cortex plays a significant role in autobiographical remembering. They also highlight that 
in many of the studies that they reviewed, the hippocampus, amygdala, and the 
cerebellum are active when one is retrieving autobiographical memories. Another 
important finding was that there is a shift in lateralization (from left-hemisphere to mid-
brain) of the autobiographical memory network caused by emotional events, whereby 
there is activation in emotion-centered regions (such as the amygdala) and deactivation in 
locations associated with cognitive processes (such as the frontal cortex).  
 Spreng and Grady (2010) investigated and compared the neural mechanisms 
underlying autobiographical memory, prospective memory, and theory of mind, 
demonstrating that the three share a common pattern of brain activity. Using fMRI, these 
researchers determined that a common pattern included activation in midline structures in 
the frontal and parietal lobes. This finding is largely consistent with the brain activity that 
has been shown to be related to self- and other-referential processing (D’Argembeau et 
al., 2008). It was also found that autobiographical memory, prospective memory, and 
theory of mind tasks activate Default Mode Network (DMN) regions, yet it is still unclear 




 The brain activity associated with false memories using the misinformation 
paradigm has also been investigated. Okado and Stark (2005) used fMRI to examine 
participants’ brain activity during the encoding of an event, and when receiving 
misinformative feedback in order to see whether the neural activity during either phase 
would predict what would be remembered. Specifically, the participants studied eight 
vignettes (this was the original event phase), and shortly afterward they studied the same 
vignettes but with changes to several details (the misinformation phase). It was found that 
neural activity recorded during encoding of the original event phase and misinformation 
phase predicted whether true or false information were later reported. . This study 
highlights  that the processes at play when encoding information play a critical role in 
determining true and false memory outcomes in the misinformation paradigm, likely 
because one must re-evaluate their memory when provided with discordant information.  
New Frontiers: Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) 
 Neurophysiological and neuroimaging techniques have contributed greatly to our 
understanding of the structure and function of the human brain, as well as to the 
underpinnings of many different neurological and psychiatric disorders. Many of the 
researchers studying the neural coordinates of autobiographical memory retrieval use 
neuroimaging devices such as Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) or 
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) to investigate brain regions responsible for 
memory and its related processes (Rubin, 2006). With increasing popularity in the area of 
cognitive neuroscience, another way to investigate this phenomenon is using Functional 




What is Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS)? 
 Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) is an emerging neuroimaging 
technique that is commonly used to measure brain activation in clinical settings, in 
emergency medicine, and in research. fNIRS is a non-invasive optical technique that uses 
near-infrared light to measure changes in the concentration of oxygenated (HbO) and 
deoxygenated (HbR) hemoglobin in the cortex, to identify the level of cerebral 
oxygenation in vivo (Rossi et al., 2012). The founder of in vivo NIRS is Frans Jöbsis-van 
der Vliet, who actually discovered its utility when he noticed that red light could 
penetrate through a 4-mm-thick bone of a beef steak when being held against visible 
light. He then moved to more relevant avenues when he demonstrated the application of 
NIRS in laboratory animals (Vliet, 1999) and for bedside monitoring of cerebral 
oxygenation in sick newborn infants (Brazy et al., 1985). The first fNIRS human study 
utilizing a single-site measurement was published in 1993 (Hoshi & Tamura, 1993). 
Since then, fNIRS has been used to study many different brain-related diseases, 
disorders, and functions. Research areas such as Alzheimer’s disease, depression, 
memory, language, the brain-computer interface and pain have been studied using fNIRS 
over the last 30 years (Ferrari & Quaresima, 2012).  
How does fNIRS Function? 
 The human brain undergoes a number of physiological changes as it responds to 
stimuli. By measuring the change in the oxygenation of hemoglobin molecules in the 
blood, fNIRS is able to quantify the level and location of neural activity in the brain. 
These changes in blood levels and electrochemical activity also affect its optical 




largely dependent on its level of oxygenation. There are two principles that NIRS relies 
upon: (1) that the tissue is transparent enough that near-infrared light can shine through 
(the NIR spectral window is 650-1000nm), and (2) that there are compounds within that 
tissue (chromophores) for which the absorption of light is dependent on the oxygenation 
of that tissue (Bakker et al., 2012). The moderately high attenuation of NIR light in tissue 
is due to hemoglobin, which is located in small blood vessels in the brain such as the 
capillary, arteriolar, and venular beds (Ferrari & Quaresima, 2012).    
 The Hemodynamic Response. Changes in cerebral blood flow and blood 
oxygenation occur upon neural activation in the brain. This hemodynamic response is 
described as an increase in the blood flow to the cortical tissue when there is an increased 
level of activity in certain brain regions (Bauernfeind et al., 2014). For brief sensory 
events, the hemodynamic response is delayed in onset and occurs about 2 seconds after 
neuronal activity (Blamire et al., 1992). This increase in neural activity causes a drop in 
glucose and oxygen stores, triggering a neurochemical cascade which results in the 
vasodilation of the blood vessels to the active brain area. This in turn, causes an influx of 
blood that is rich in oxygenated hemoglobin, reaching a state of equilibrium after 
approximately 30 seconds (Bauernfeind et al., 2014; Tak & Ye, 2014).  
 The canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) is widely used in fNIRS 
and fMRI research and is an essential step in the statistical analysis of both modalities of 
data collection. The typical hemodynamic response in adults has been well-established 
and demonstrates an increase in oxygenated and total hemoglobin concentrations and a 
decrease in deoxygenated hemoglobin concentration with demonstrated reproducible and 




functional activity for the task should look like (i.e., peak of the canonical hemodynamic 
response), data collected via fNIRS can be compared to this model in order to determine 
the overall fit, which is represented by General Linear Model (GLM)-generated “peak” 
beta coefficients.   
NIRS techniques. There are three different NIRS techniques that are used, each 
of which are based on a different type of illumination. The first is the continuous-wave 
(CW) modality, which is based on the constant illumination of the tissue to measure the 
light attenuation through the head. Second is the frequency-domain (FD) method, which 
illuminates the head with intensity-modulated light, measuring both attenuation and the 
phase delay of the emerging light. Lastly, the time-domain (TD) technique illuminates the 
head with short pulses of light and then detects the shape of the pulse after its propagation 
through the tissue (Ferrari & Quaresima, 2012). Ferrari and Quaresima (2012) add that 
only the FD and TD techniques fully characterize the optical properties of the tissues 
(absorption and reduced scattering coefficients), which makes it possible to retrieve 
absolute oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin concentrations. 
 In the current study, the frequency-domain method is utilized by our ISS Imagent 
System (ISS Medical, 2016). The data to be collected includes information regarding the 
average magnitude (DC), amplitude (AC), and the phase of the signals, for each channel. 
Each data collection cycle contains an average waveform for each light source, resulting 
in 16 sets of data per cycle for a system with eight sources (each containing a paired fiber 




Advantages of Using fNIRS 
 The major advantages of optical techniques are the specificity, the temporal 
resolution (which is in the millisecond range), the potential to measure 
intracellular/intravascular events simultaneously, and the ease with which devices can be 
transported (Pinti et al., 2018). Because of this, and the fact that it is non-invasive and 
safe, fNIRS has become quite popular in many different settings. By utilizing laser diodes 
that span the optical window of 650-1000nm, and flexible fibre-optic cables to carry the 
NIR light from the source to the detector, fNIRS can be used in different head positions 
and postures (Ferrari & Quaresima, 2012). The placement of the apparatus can be done in 
natural environments without the need for restraint or sedation. Similar to fMRI, fNIRS 
systems rely on similar principles of cerebrovascular activity. However, fNIRS is much 
less expensive to buy and maintain, is safe for those for whom MRI would be unsafe 
(e.g., those with metallic implants, those with past surgery, and those with 
claustrophobia), and is more portable and thus creates more natural testing situations. 
This allows for standard psychological and neuropsychological testing to be conducted 
without the need for much adaptation (Ferrari, Ferrari, & Quaresima, 2007; Noah et al., 
2015). Like fMRI, the changes in blood oxygenation that occur in response to certain 
tasks or stimuli can be measured, and these changes can be attributed to differing levels 
and locations of cortical activity (Fantini, 2014; Scarapicchia et al., 2017). fMRI relies on 
the Blood Oxygen-Level Dependent (BOLD) signal to measure only deoxygenated 
hemoglobin, whereas fNIRS measures both oxygenated (HbO) and deoxygenated (HbR) 
hemoglobin, thus allowing for a better understanding of the hemodynamic forces 




Disadvantages of Using fNIRS 
 It is clear that there are many advantages to using fNIRS as a neuroimaging 
device, however there are several disadvantages that should also be discussed. fNIRS has 
low spatial resolution, and its penetration depth is only about 1.5-2 centimeters. This 
means that it is impossible to gather information related to structure and anatomy of the 
brain (Pinti et al., 2018). As well, fNIRS is susceptible to motion errors (however, all 
imaging modalities encounter motion artifact limitations), nonetheless several techniques 
have been developed to correct for them (Scholkmann et al., 2010; Brigadoi et al., 2014). 
Potentially the most substantial limitation is the lack of standardization in the pre-
processing and data analysis procedures used when conducting studies with fNIRS; to 
date there is neither an agreement nor guidelines on the analysis of fNIRS data as in other 
well-established technologies like fMRI (Pinti et al., 2018; Pinti et al., 2019).  
fNIRS Data Analysis 
 Since fNIRS was developed, it has grown rapidly, with the number of 
publications doubling every 3.5 years (Boas et al., 2014). Recent advances in this 
technology have allowed researchers to examine neurovascular physiology with both 
increased resolution and quality. However, due to the rapid increase in new users 
employing various commercial software’s using various different fNIRS machines, there 
is increasing concern that many studies may be biased by suboptimal processing methods 
(Pfiefer et al., 2018). Hocke et al. (2018) state that due to the lack of standardized and 
automated processing and analysis of fNIRS data, it is difficult to reproduce studies, 




experienced fNIRS researchers. Because of this, the current position on both fNIRS pre-
processing and statistical analyses is discussed. 
 Pre-processing of fNIRS data. In a recent review by Pinti et al. (2019), the issue 
of heterogeneity in the analytic approaches and pre-processing procedures within the 
realm of fNIRS research are brought to light. The authors outline a sequence of four steps 
that should be followed when designing an fNIRS study (see Figure 2). Step three of this 
model focuses specifically on the pre-processing phase of fNIRS data analysis, which is 
when raw intensity fNIRS data are visually inspected in order to assess the signals’ 
quality (i.e., to determine the presence and magnitude of large motion artifacts, heartbeat 
oscillations), and then adjusted. fNIRS signals generally contain two types of noise: 
physiological noise and non-physiological noise. Physiological noise includes systemic 
interference that is driven by changes in blood pressure due to cardiac processes, 
respiration, Mayer waves, and low-frequency oscillations (Elwell et al., 1999; Saager & 
Berger, 2008; Gregg et al., 2010) or indirectly by head/body movements (von Luhmann 
et al., 2020). On the other hand, non-physiological noise involves motion artifacts that are 
caused by optode-scalp decoupling (Cooper et al., 2012; Brigadoi et al., 2014) and other 
instrumental noise. In order to ensure that the fNIRS data is correct and therefore useful, 
any source of variability in the oxygenated (HbO) and deoxygenated (HbR) hemoglobin 






Figure 2. A typical fNIRS experimental pipeline as outlined by Pinti et al. (2019). 
 
 Pinti et al. (2019) discuss that digital filtering (a mathematical procedure) is 
applied in order to reduce or enhance certain aspects of input signals. These digital filters 
are divided into three classes: (1) high-pass filters, which are used to remove high 
frequency components above the cut-off frequency; (2) low-pass filters, which are used 
to remove low frequency components that are below the cut-off frequency; and (3) band-
pass filters which are used to preserve the frequency range between a lower and a higher 
cut-off frequency. Pinti et al. (2019) stress that the pre-processing pipeline followed by 
researchers is exceedingly important, since this data manipulation can impact subsequent 
group-level statistical analyses. In other words, a mistake made during data pre-
processing can render your study’s findings as useless. 
 Huppert (2016) provides a review of the noise structures that can often be seen in 
fNIRS data, highlighting the impact that noise can have on some statistical tests. When 
the assumptions of statistical tests are violated by properties of fNIRS such as serially 




motion artifacts, Huppert (2016) suggests two possible ways of remediating the problem. 
First, we can remove the noise/artifacts from the data. However, a common problem with 
this is that there is no perfect method of removing all types of artifacts. This in turn, 
makes it subjective and thus relies upon the researcher’s expertise to select and use the 
signal processing tools correctly. If noise is incompletely removed, assumptions of the 
statistical model can still be violated, leading to inaccurate reporting of the results. A 
second suggested approach to handling noise artifacts is to leave the data alone and 
instead change the assumptions of the statistical model, allowing for a more generalized 
model that can handle the properties of the artifact without violating assumptions.   
 Von Luhmann and colleagues (2020a; 2020b) agree that in order to recover 
underlying brain activation patterns during pre-processing, researchers need to carefully 
remove or modify these confounding factors from the fNIRS signal. Therefore, these pre-
processing corrections can either be applied prior to the hemodynamic response function 
(HRF) estimation or, ideally, simultaneously with the HRF estimation as is the case with 
the General Linear Model (Friston, 1994; Cohen-Adad et al., 2007). The General Linear 
Model (GLM) is especially useful because it allows for the simultaneous extraction of the 
evoked HRF while filtering confounding signals with the help of nuisance regressors 
(short-separation fNIRS measurements) (Zhang et al., 2007; Saager & Berger, 2008; 
Gagnon et al., 2011). Von Luhmann et al. (2020b) explain that this allows the contrast to 
noise ratio (CNR) of the evoked hemodynamic brain activity to be increased, and the risk 
of falsely classifying task-evoked systemic physiology instead of brain activity is 
reduced. This therefore enhances accuracy, sensitivity, and specificity of fNIRS single 




 Statistical analysis of fNIRS data. In a recent review by Yücel et al. (2017), the 
authors describe that after the pre-processing phase and cleaning of the data are complete, 
a statistical model is to be used to detect the differences in the level of hemoglobin 
between pairs of tasks or between a task and baseline. As mentioned by von Luhmann et 
al. (2020b), the current state-of-the-art analysis in fNIRS research is the General Linear 
Model with Short-Separation regression (GLM with SS), which can be implemented 
either during or after pre-processing. This method is important because it uses measured 
hemoglobin changes modeled as linear combinations of regressors derived from the 
timing of the stimulus events (Yücel et al., 2017). As highlighted by Tak and Ye (2014), 
Huppert (2016) and Pinti et al. (2019), there is continued debate about the optimal model 
to use with fNIRS data analysis in order to maximize sensitivity, and when to apply this 
model is also in question (von Luhmann et al., 2020). As statistical methods continue to 
be proposed and utilized, Yücel et al. (2017) describe that there is an increasing need for 
more rigorous comparisons of the tradeoffs in the sensitivity and specificity of these 
methods.  
 Past studies such as Murata et al. (2002) simply calculated the concentration 
changes of hemoglobin oxygenation during their task period and then depicted the time-
series of cerebral oxygenation changes for visual inspection. Tak and Ye (2014) discuss 
that such simple approaches as this are prone to error, particularly when the noise and 
interference level increases. They discuss that various different statistical analysis 
methods have been used in the past to compare means, including t-tests (Germon et al., 
1994; Hoshi et al., 2003), and multi-way ANOVAs (Arenth et al., 2007; Bartocci et al. 




directly related to the hemodynamic response, and when using these simple statistics, 
information about the time course is lost.  
 In order to overcome some of these weaknesses, the General Linear Model 
(GLM) began to be used, which assumes that data can be represented as a linear 
combination of several sources or regressors (Friston et al., 2011). The first to apply the 
GLM to analyze fNIRS data was Schroeter et al. (2004), and since then numerous authors 
have employed this method of statistical analysis (Tak & Ye, 2014). A GLM is a flexible 
generalization of an ordinary linear regression model which allows for the response 
variables to have errors distributions other than the normal distribution. As mentioned, 
this is what most researchers have agreed upon as best practice for fNIRS statistical 
analyses today (Yücel et al., 2017). In a recent study by Jahani et al. (2017), the authors 
estimated a hemodynamic response function (HRF) by using a GLM, which was then 
used to attain information about the time course of the data in the form of beta 
coefficients. Paired student’s t-tests were then conducted on these beta coefficients to 
evaluate the statistically significant differences in hemodynamic responses to their 
stimuli. Of course, due to multiple comparisons often leading to an inflated type I error 
rate, a Benjamini-Hochberg multiple comparison correction is recommended to be 
applied (Jahani et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2020). This is the approach that was followed in the 
current study, as it is deemed to be the leading method of statistical analysis of fNIRS 
data.  
The Current Study 
 This research project was designed to explore the neural activity of healthy adults’ 




Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS). The results of this study will provide the first 
investigation of the neurological plausibility of Scoboria’s (2020) model, thus allowing 
for the cortical dissociation between the metamemorial appraisals of belief in accuracy 
and belief in occurrence to be made. Therefore, this study aims to demonstrate 
differential activation patterns based on cognitive consistency and dissonance. The 
preceding literature review demonstrates the importance of understanding these 
appraisals, highlighting the impact that feedback from others can have on remembering. 
In order to understand the broad effects of disconfirmatory social feedback, we must first 
appreciate the distinct underlying cognitive mechanisms at play.  
 When memories are challenged by others, this can lead to changes in one’s belief 
in the occurrence and/or the accuracy of their memory. Past research (Scoboria, Talarico, 
& Pascal, 2015; Korcsog 2017; Korcsog 2018; Korcsog et al., In Preparation) has 
demonstrated that experimentally providing disconfirmatory feedback about scene 
occurrence and the content of a scene results in a distinction between belief in accuracy 
and belief in occurrence appraisals. Korcsog (2017; 2018) and Korcsog et al. (In 
Preparation) were the first to use procedures that implemented stimuli with a narrative 
structure, reflecting the narrative coherence that Rubin (2006) describes autobiographical 
memories to have. The next step in this line of research is to investigate whether the 
regions of the brain that are active when receiving and evaluating feedback about 
occurrence and accuracy are distinct in their location and/or their level of activation in the 
brain.  
 The first research question is whether the level and location of oxygenated 




about the occurrence vs. the accuracy of their memory. Conway et al., (1999) found that 
the left frontal cortex was active during the retrieval of autobiographical memories, and 
so a left frontal cortical array was created in order to measure activation when 
participants receive feedback about their memory. It was hypothesized that there will in 
fact be a difference in activation, since it has been demonstrated that despite being rated 
highly synonymously, these appraisals can be dissociated (Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 
2015; Korcsog, 2017; Korcsog, 2018; Otgaar et al., 2018; Korcsog et al., In Preparation). 
Because of this proposed dissociation, the neurocognitive mechanisms that are used to 
differentiate knowledge of memory occurrence and accuracy may be distinct. As well, 
research on the mental construction of details versus the mental construction of whole 
scenes demonstrates that different brain regions contribute to each. In one study by 
Summerfield, Hassabis, & MacGuire (2010), the mental construction of details activated 
areas such as the hippocampus and the retrosplenial cortex, whereas the mental 
construction of whole scenes activated the left and right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. 
 The second research question is whether there will be a distinction between the 
level and location of brain activity associated with confirmatory vs. disconfirmatory 
feedback about memory accuracy and occurrence. In other words, will the brain activity 
associated with telling a person that they are correct about the occurrence of a memory 
differ from when the same person is told that they are incorrect about the occurrence of 
that memory (i.e., telling the participant that the event that they remembered did not 
actually occur in the past). As well, will the left frontal activity associated with telling a 
person that their description of a memory was accurate differ from telling a person that 




participants receive disconfirmatory feedback, it was expected that they would 
experience cognitive dissonance. One study by Van Veen and colleagues (2009) 
describes that when people experience cognitive dissonance, the dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex and anterior insula are engaged. Because fNIRS is unable to measure the activity 
of these deep brain structures, it is impossible to determine whether dissonance has 
occurred. However, it has been demonstrated that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is 
involved in decision making (Rosenbloom, Schmahmann, & Price, 2012) and in 
reasoning (Goel & Dolan, 2004). Because of this, it is hypothesized that when given 
disconfirmatory feedback about a memory, decision-making processes will come into 
play in order to determine whether to accept or reject the feedback. This in turn, should 
result in increased activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.  
 In further exploration of the second research question, participants’ responses to 
disconfirmatory feedback about memory accuracy and occurrence will be compared to 
their belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence rating items. This will be done in order to 
determine whether ratings reflecting relinquishment of memory show different patterns of 
brain activation than ratings reflecting maintenance of memory. It was hypothesized that 
regardless of whether participants chose to hold on to or relinquish their memory, 
reasoning and decision-making processes would come into play, thus resulting in 











 Twenty-four participants were recruited through the University of Windsor 
Participant Pool, and all participants apart from those who had a visual or auditory 
impairment or those who had participated in a study with a similar deceptive component 
in the past (i.e., The Actions Study 2014-2017 or Remembering Recorded Events 2017-
2019) were eligible to participate. Of these 24 participants, 17 possessed adequate fNIRS 
signal strength to be included in the statistical analyses (88% female, 68% Caucasian; 
Mage = 21.94, SD = 4.18, range 19-31). All participants received academic credit for 
completing the study, regardless of whether or not adequate fNIRS signal strength was 
obtained.  
Measures 
Belief in Occurrence 
 Two items derived from Scoboria et al. (2004) were included to assess belief in 
occurrence before and after the participant was challenged about their memory for the 
occurrence of scenes. The items were measured using 7-point Likert-style scales and 
were averaged to calculate the scale score. See Appendix A containing the verbatim 
presentation of these questions. 
Belief in Accuracy 
 Two items derived from Scoboria, Talarico, and Pascal (2015) were included to 
assess belief in accuracy before and after the participant was given feedback about their 




scales and are averaged to calculate the scale score. See Appendix A for the verbatim 
presentation of these questions. 
Event Recordings 
 Sixty scenes were presented to each participant, 30 as silent videos and 30 as 
audio recordings. There was a 5-second delay between each scene, where a black screen 
with a white target was shown in order to re-direct attention to the computer screen. A 
JVC Everio GZ-HM200 Dual SD High Definition Camcorder was used to record all of 
the videos that were used as stimuli in this study and were recorded in October 2016 as a 
part of Korcsog’s (2017; 2018) study. An ASUS Zenbook UX303UA-DH51T Intel i5 
computer was also utilized in October 2016 to record all the sound recordings that were 
presented in this study. Each of the recorded scenes were under 35 seconds in length and 
contained at least four steps, with all of the scenes being neutral in nature and relatively 
simple (see Appendix B for a list of the titles of the scenes that were presented to 
participants, and Appendix C for a list of the titles of the scenes that were prompted but 
never presented). Each scene depicted the same actress, a 15-year old girl, who gave 
permission for the recordings to be used. The scenes were kept relatively similar, 
meaning that they all consisted of the same actress, wearing the same clothes, doing 
everyday tasks. All items used in the scenes were common household objects. A sample 
of what three of the scenes looked like is found in Figure 3, and a sample transcription of 





Figure 3. Three examples of simple scenes that were presented to participants, also 
presented in Korcsog (2018). From top to bottom the scenes are: A girl washing dishes, a 
girl hitting a baseball, and a girl making a sandwich. Each video-recorded scene was 
under 35 seconds in length and consisted of at least 3 steps. The videos were muted so 
participants would receive only visual stimulation.  
 
fNIRS Probe Placement 
 The NIRS probe was designed using AtlasViewerGUI software (Aasted et al., 
2015). The probe design and the probe itself can be seen in Figure 4. The probe consists 
of eight sources and two detectors, with short-separation channels being 10mm apart and 
long-separation channels being 30mm apart. There are 16 channels containing two 
different wavelengths, totaling a total of 32 channels. This probe covers the left prefrontal 






Figure 4. Pictorial depiction of the configuration of the fNIRS array as displayed by 
AtlasViewerGUI. The red numbers denote the optode locations and the blue numbers 
denote the detector locations. The anatomical landmarks derived from the 10-20 system 
are labelled in black. 
 
fNIRS System 
 Data were acquired using the ISS Imagent System (ISS Medical, 2016) which 
utilizes laser diodes at 690 and 830nm and acquires signals from the photo-detectors at a 
modulation frequency of 110Hz. ISS Imagent (ISS Medical, 2016) is a frequency-domain 
(FD) system consisting of 16 optical channels, each with two wavelengths. The 10mW 
average powered laser light is carried from the FD system to the head probe via optical 








 After completing the consent process, participants were asked to sit in front of a 
computer and to put on the provided headphones. They were instructed to watch and 
listen carefully to 30 silent videos and 30 audio-recorded descriptions (with no visual 
stimuli) of an actress performing simple tasks (see Appendix B for a list of the titles of 
these tasks that were presented during session 1). Each of these scenes were under 35 
seconds in length, and the mode of presentation (video vs. audio) was counterbalanced 
among participants. The recordings alternated randomly between video and audio-
recorded scenes, with a 5-second delay in between each scene. See Figure 3 for a visual 
depiction of these scenes and Appendix F for a transcription of an audio-recorded scene.  
Session 2  
 Session 2 took place exactly one week after session 1 and was divided into two 
parts: Phase 1 and Phase 2. During Phase 1, termed “The Recognition Phase”, 
participants were asked questions about their memory for 90 scenes. 30 questions were 
about scenes that were presented as a video, 30 questions were about scenes that were 
presented as an audio-recording, and 30 questions were about scenes that were never 
actually presented (see Appendix C for a list of the titles of scenes that were prompted, 
but never actually presented to participants). First, participants were asked whether each 
scene was presented in session 1. If they answered “yes”, they were then asked if the 
scene was presented as a video or as an audio recording. Then, they were asked to 




and belief in the accuracy of their memory using the aforementioned scales found in 
Appendix A.  
 During Phase 2, “The Feedback Phase”, the Functional Near-Infrared 
Spectroscopy (fNIRS) was set-up and feedback was administered whilst recording each 
participant’s brain activity. At least two researchers were present for this portion of the 
study, one of them provided the feedback to the participant while the other ran the fNIRS 
machine and created time-stamps when each form of feedback was given. The researcher 
who was running the fNIRS data collection was laser safety trained and had been 
thoroughly trained on fNIRS safety protocol. Anatomical landmarks of the skull were 
measured using the 10-20 system (commonly used in EEG research), and temporary 
markings were made using medical tape to indicate the positions that the left prefrontal 
array were to be oriented in. Once the landmarks were set, the neoprene cap was secured 
using a combination of Velcro and fabric straps (in order to ensure a snug and 
comfortable fit). This cap held the optode mounts, and for each participant, each mount 
was examined in order to ensure that a clear view of the scalp was available, and hair was 
parted or moved slightly using a soft plastic rod or Q-tip. After this, the optodes and 
detectors, which were secured in a plastic enclosure, were secured to the cap’s mount. 
Only at this time was the laser bank turned on in order to prevent accidental exposure to 
the laser light during the mounting process.  
 Once the lasers were turned on, the data collection software was initiated, and an 
automated signal optimization process was carried out. If any of the optodes needed to be 
adjusted due to poor signal strength (i.e., due to having an obstructed view of the scalp 




cleared, and reseated. After adequate signal strength was confirmed, the software was set 
to record. The data captured includes: a timestamp of the data point (system time, in 
seconds), the marker that was set (to signal the feedback being given to the participant, 
the end of the feedback, and after a 10 second delay, the beginning of the questioning), 
and three forms of signals for each of the source-detector pairs (16 pairs in the current 
set-up): amplitude, the moving average value, and the phase/variance of the signal. No 
identifying information was recorded through this software, and participant data was 
deidentified by use of a participant number and condition (e.g., 07.B2).  
 There were 10 instances of feedback about randomly selected scenes that 
participants had accurately remembered as being presented as a video in session 1. Each 
instance of feedback had an epoch length of approximately 35-40 seconds in order for the 
hemodynamic response to reset. For 2 scenes, participants were given positive feedback 
about event occurrence (i.e., “you were correct in saying that a scene of a girl ___ was 
presented”), for 2 scenes participants were given negative feedback about event 
occurrence (i.e., “you were incorrect in saying that a scene of a girl __ was presented”), 
for 2 scenes participants were given positive feedback about memory accuracy (i.e., “in 
the scene of a girl __ you remembered more than 90% of the details correctly”) and for 2 
scenes participants were given negative feedback about memory accuracy (i.e., “in the 
scene of a girl __ you remembered less than 50% of the details correctly”). Finally, there 
were 2 scenes for which participants did not receive any feedback about their memory 
(i.e., “please re-rate the scene __”), which acted as a control condition. For a summary of 




scenes with the same belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence items as used before 
receiving social feedback (see Appendix A). 
 
Table 1.  
A summary table depicting all five forms of social feedback presented to participants. 
 Belief in Accuracy Belief in Occurrence 
+ “ In your description of the scene 
________, you remembered more 
than 90% of the details correctly.” 
“ You were correct in saying that 
a scene of a girl __________ was 
presented.”  
- “In your description of the scene 
_________, you remembered less 
than 50% of the details correctly.” 
“You were incorrect in saying 
that a scene of a girl ________ 
was presented.” 
0 “Please re-rate the scene _______.” 
Note. The “+” denotes positive/confirmatory feedback, the “-“ denotes 
negative/disconfirmatory feedback, and the “0” denotes no feedback/control.  
 
 After the completion of the study, participants were asked the following 
questions: “What do you think that we are studying today?” and “how did you feel when 
you were told that you recalled some of the scenes incorrectly?”. Participants were then 
read a debriefing statement explaining why the use of deception in the study is necessary, 
and that the feedback given in this study is not indicative of their true memory abilities. 
They were informed as to which items they received deceptive feedback about. Then, the 
utility of the fNIRS was explained to each participant before asking whether they agreed 
for us to keep their data. Finally, each participant was asked what it was like for them to 
participate in our study and whether they had any questions before being prompted to 




 The recorded fNIRS data was saved into a text file (.txt) with the time and date of 
the recording, as well as the participant’s code. The laser bank was turned off, and the 
optodes and cap were removed from each participant. The surfaces of the optodes and 
their holders were disinfected with wipes, and the participant was provided with paper 
towel and a mirror to remove any perspiration that may have accumulated on their scalp 
and to re-style their hair. The participants’ data was later converted to a MATLAB 
compatible .NIRS file for pre-processing.  
Data Analysis and Statistics 
fNIRS Data Pre-Processing 
 Both during and after the completion of each of the 24 participants, the data was 
visually inspected using the BOXY software provided by ISS Imagent (ISS Medical, 
2016) in order to determine whether signal strength and quality was adequate. Of the 24 
recruited participants, 17 participants were deemed to have adequate signal strength and 
quality, and thus were included in the analyses. The guidelines for establishing adequate 
signal quality by Orihuela-Espina et al. (2010) were used, which included obtaining an 
average amplitude (AC signal) of greater than 100, magnitude (DC signal) of 2000, and a 
signal variance (phase) of less than 10. Pre-processing of the data was completed using 
Homer2 Toolbox (Huppert et al., 2009), MATLAB, and NIRS-SPM MATLAB scripts 
(Ye, Tak, Jan, Jung, & Jang, 2009). Using a Boxy2Homer MATLAB script, the data 
were converted from a raw text file exported from BOXY into a NIRS format that 
Homer2 was able to process (Huppert et al., 2009). Light intensity data were converted to 
hemodynamic data using the optical density and modified Beer-Lambert Law commands 




Because the hemodynamic signal moves along a temporal continuum over time, and thus 
starts to drift, a first order polynomial drift correction was implemented. This is a 
conventional method to eliminate system drift from the fNIRS device (Orihuela-Espina et 
al., 2010). In order to partially remove the effects of cardiac and respiratory noise on the 
signal and to reduce motion artifacts, a low-pass filter (0.5Hz) and a high-pass filter 
(0.02Hz) were applied to the data.   
 Slow-wave oscillations (e.g., Mayer Waves) can overlap with the hemodynamic 
response, thus making it difficult to remove without removing the signal from cortical 
activity (Tak & Ye, 2014). However, leaving Mayer waves in the signal can also 
inadvertently inflate type-I error (Pinti et al., 2019). Therefore, to allow for the removal 
of noise that is attributable to surface-level effects, short signal optodes that capture 
surface-level vascular changes were used as covariates for the deeper optodes using the 
short-signal GLM algorithm (Gagnon et al., 2011). Short-signal separation has become a 
widely used method to remove physiological noise from the cortical signal and is an 
effective means of reducing signal contamination without compromising the true cortical 
signal (Tak & Ye, 2014). After this was implemented, the resulting processing stream 
was considered to be a relatively pure concentration function for oxygenated, 
deoxygenated, and total hemoglobin for each channel, which consists of only cortical 
signal changes.  
 The processed signals were further separated by time into epochs based on 
experimental events. For the purposes of this study, the pre-event phase was during the 
feedback that was read to the participant, and the post-event phase was the 20 seconds 




epoch was produced using run-based processing which averages each participant’s signal 
across multiple trials. These analyses were conducted across groups (type of feedback), 
averaging these runs across participants.  
 The separation of the signals between the channels was optimized using a short-
signal GLM algorithm (Gagnon et al., 2014). This algorithm contains a GLM with a 
modified gamma function, which is able to effectively separate the hemodynamic 
response from each epoch’s baseline. This allows for a clear and interpretable graph of 
the hemodynamic response to be created. The hemodynamic response function (HRF) 
was then estimated by using a general linear model (GLM) which uses the least squares 
method for estimating the beta coefficients of the consecutive basis functions. The GLM 
is especially important because it is used to incorporate the time course of the whole HRF 
for each subject, by generating beta coefficients by use of a linear regression analysis.  
Statistical Analyses 
 For the statistical analyses of the pre-processed fNIRS data (which at this point, 
are in the form of GLM-generated beta coefficients), paired Student’s t-tests were used to 
evaluate statistically significant differences in hemodynamic responses to each feedback 
condition in the time range of 5-10 seconds. This time range was used because this is 
when the hemodynamic response signal reaches its peak. Because of the large number of 
comparisons made using the paired Student’s t-tests, a multiple comparison correction 
was applied using the Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate (FDR) method with a 
false discovery rate of 0.05. For the analyses of the change in belief in occurrence and 




change scores [post-pre] and 95% confidence intervals were calculated as per the 
Cumming (2014) method. 
 For qualitative analyses of fNIRS data, such as the description of activation 
profiles, the activation profiles provided for each epoch/condition within the Homer2 
Toolbox (Huppert et al., 2009) and AtlasViewerGUI (Aasted et al., 2015) were used. The 
group averages were imported into the AtlasViewerGUI program which was used to 
better demonstrate the functional patterns on a brain model across the different feedback 
conditions and across participant relinquishment type. This created a map of functional 
activity on a standard brain atlas representing 3D space which allowed for easier visual 
comparisons to be made across feedback conditions and across relinquishment types.  
CHAPTER 3 
Results 
 The influence of social feedback on memory was examined by the use of 
Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) in order to determine whether the 
neurocognitive mechanisms at play were distinct dependent on the type of social 
feedback received, and on one’s response to this feedback. These analyses included the 
examination of the contrasts between each fNIRS channel, hemoglobin type (HbO, HbR, 
HbT), and condition (see Table 1), as well as between pre- and post-scores on the belief 
in accuracy and belief in occurrence rating scales (Appendix A).  
fNIRS Analyses 
 The group mean (n=17 participants) temporal traces of the oxy-hemoglobin 
(HbO), deoxy-hemoglobin (HbR), and total hemoglobin (HbT) concentration changes 




Table 2. These p-values represent the significance levels of paired Student’s t-tests 
performed on the average beta coefficients obtained from 5-10 seconds of the 
hemodynamic response function (HRF), representing the “peak hemodynamic response”. 
A Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate (FDR) correction was applied to account 
for multiple comparisons. The group mean spatial results averaged over 5-10 seconds are 
also overlaid on brain surfaces for better visual presentation of the different brain regions 
involved in the different conditions of social feedback (see Figures 5-9). Channel 3,2 and 
6,2 were removed from the analyses due to poor overall signal quality across participants. 
One participant was removed from the analyses for channel 5,2 due to poor signal 
















Temporal traces of oxy-hemoglobin (HbO), deoxy-hemoglobin (HbR), and total 
hemoglobin (HbT) concentration changes by feedback condition. 
Abbreviations. MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute and Hospital; Ctrl = Control; + 
Occ = Positive Occurrence; + Acc = Positive Accuracy; - Occ = Negative Occurrence; - 
Acc = Negative Accuracy; HbO = Oxygenated Hemoglobin; HbR = Deoxygenated 
Hemoglobin; HbT = Total Hemoglobin. Note. Students’ paired samples t-tests were 
conducted on beta coefficients resultant from the linear regression of hemoglobin 
concentrations to the HRF. The depicted p-values were obtained from paired samples t-
tests conducted on “peak beta coefficients” obtained from the 5-10 second range. 
 








































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. The average activation pattern of the control condition overlaid on a 3D image 






Figure 6. The average activation pattern of the “Positive Occurrence” condition overlaid 






Figure 7. The average activation pattern of the “Positive Accuracy” condition overlaid on 






Figure 8. The average activation pattern of the “Negative Occurrence” condition overlaid 






Figure 9. The average activation pattern of the “Negative Accuracy” condition overlaid 





Does Oxygenated Hemoglobin Concentration and Location Differ Between 
Occurrence and Accuracy Conditions? 
 To address the first research question asking whether the level and location of 
oxygenated hemoglobin in the belief in accuracy conditions differs from the belief in 
occurrence conditions, paired samples t-tests were conducted to compare the peak beta 
coefficients across four conditions: positive accuracy, positive occurrence, negative 
accuracy, and negative occurrence. For channel 1,1 (BA 8; left medial prefrontal cortex), 
there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for 
positive accuracy (M = 1.68 x 10-7, SD = 1.25 x 10-7) and positive occurrence (M = 1.41 x 
10-8, SD = 2.91 x 10-8); t(195) = -18.53, p = .000; (d = 1.70). There was a significant 
difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = 1.68 x 
10-7, SD = 1.25 x 10-7) and negative occurrence (M = 3.47 x 10-7, SD = 1.43 x 10-7); 
t(195) = -11.22, p = .000; (d = 1.33). There was a significant difference in the oxygenated 
hemoglobin concentration for positive occurrence (M = 1.41 x 10-8, SD = 2.92 x 10-8) and 
negative accuracy (M = 1.84 x 10-7, SD =6.82 x 10-8); t(195) = -27.91, p = .000; (d = 
3.27). There was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for 
negative occurrence (M = 3.47 x 10-7, SD = 1.43 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = 1.84 
x 10-7, SD = 6.82 x 10-8); t(195) = -21.78, p = .000; (d = 1.45). These findings are shown 









Channel 1,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing feedback about 
accuracy and occurrence. 




t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Cohen’s d 




-18.53 195 .000** 1.70 




    




-11.22 195 .000** 1.33 




    




-27.91 195 .000** 3.27 




    




-21.78 195 .000** 1.45 




    
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ = 
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory 
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.  
 
 For channel 2,1 (BA 9; left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), there was a significant 
difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = -1.15 
x 10-8, SD = 8.49 x 10-8) and positive occurrence (M = 1.76 x 10-7, SD = 9.59 x 10-8); 
t(195) = 18.80, p = .000; (d = 2.07). There was a significant difference in the oxygenated 
hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = -1.15 x 10-8, SD = 8.49 x 10-8) and 
negative occurrence (M = 2.03 x 10-7, SD = 1.03 x 10-7); t(195) = -43.30, p = .000; (d = 




positive occurrence (M = 1.76 x 10-7, SD = 9.59 x 10-8) and negative accuracy (M = 5.84 
x 10-8, SD =5.75 x 10-8); t(195) = 15.66, p = .000; (d = 2.57). Finally, there was a 
significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for negative 
occurrence (M = 2.03 x 10-7, SD = 1.03 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = 5.84 x 10-8, 




Channel 2,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing feedback about 
accuracy and occurrence. 




t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Cohen’s d 




18.80 195 .000** 2.07 




    




-43.30 195 .000** 2.28 




    




15.66 195 .000** 2.57 




    




17.43 195 .000** 1.74 




    
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ = 
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory 





 For channel 3,1 (BA 9; left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), there was a significant 
difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = -2.18 
x 10-7, SD = 8.51 x 10-8) and positive occurrence (M = -2.45 x 10-7, SD = 1.09 x 10-7); 
t(195) = -2.57, p = .015; (d = 0.30). There was a significant difference in the oxygenated 
hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = -2.18 x 10-7, SD = 8.51 x 10-8) and 
negative occurrence (M = -5.55 x 10-8, SD = 4.83 x 10-8); t(195) = -28.20, p = .000. There 
was no significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive 
occurrence (M = -2.45 x 10-7, SD = 1.09 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = -2.51 x 10-7, 
SD =8.88 x 10-8); t(195) = 0.49, p = .623. There was a significant difference in the 
oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for negative occurrence (M = -5.55 x 10-8, SD = 
4.83 x 10-8) and negative accuracy (M = -2.51 x 10-7, SD =8.88 x 10-8); t(195) = 20.60, p 
















Channel 3,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing feedback about 
accuracy and occurrence. 




t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Cohen’s d 




-2.57 195 .015* 0.30 




    




-28.20 195 .000** 2.36 




    




0.49 195 .623 0.09 




    




20.60 195 .000** 2.75 




    
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ = 
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory 
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.  
 
 For channel 4,1 (BA 10; anterior prefrontal cortex), there was a significant 
difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for the positive accuracy 
condition (M = 3.38 x 10-7, SD = 1.18 x 10-7) and positive occurrence (M = 5.86 x 10-9, 
SD = 1.16 x 10-7); t(195) = -40.18, p = .000; (d = 2.84). There was a significant difference 
in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = 3.38 x 10-7, SD = 
1.18 x 10-7) and negative occurrence (M = 9.99 x 10-8, SD = 8.04 x 10-8); t(195) = 48.05, 




concentration for positive occurrence (M = 5.86 x 10-9, SD = 1.16 x 10-7) and negative 
accuracy (M = 8.40 x 10-8, SD =9.65 x 10-8); t(195) = -23.58, p = .000; (d = 1.09). There 
was not a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for negative 
occurrence (M = 9.99 x 10-8, SD = 8.04 x 10-8) and negative accuracy (M = 8.40 x 10-8, 




Channel 4,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing feedback about 
accuracy and occurrence. 




t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Cohen’s d 




-40.18 195 .000** 2.84 




    




48.05 195 .000** 2.37 




    




-23.58 195 .000** 1.09 




    




1.76 195 .081 0.18 




    
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ = 
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory 





 For channel 4,2 (BA 10; left anterior prefrontal cortex), there was a significant 
difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for the positive accuracy 
condition (M = 4.22 x 10-7, SD = 9.55 x 10-8) and positive occurrence (M = 2.44 x 10-7, 
SD = 6.42 x 10-8); t(195) = -45.49, p = .000; (d = 2.19). There was a significant difference 
in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = 4.22-7, SD = 9.55 
x 10-8) and negative occurrence (M = -2.08 x 10-7, SD = 2.59 x 10-7); t(195) = 41.17, p = 
.000; (d = 3.23). There was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin 
concentration for positive occurrence (M = 2.44 x 10-7, SD = 6.42 x 10-8) and negative 
accuracy (M = 2.90 x 10-8, SD =1.11 x 10-7); t(195) = 44.96, p = .000; (d = 2.37). There 
was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for negative 
occurrence (M = -2.08 x 10-7, SD = 2.59 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = 2.90 x 10-8, 
















Channel 4,2 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing feedback about 
accuracy and occurrence. 




t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Cohen’s d 




-45.49 195 .000** 2.19 




    




41.96 195 .000** 3.23 




    




44.96 195 .000** 2.37 




    




-17.36 195 .000** 1.60 




    
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ = 
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory 
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.  
 
 For channel 5,2 (BA 45; left inferior frontal gyrus opercularis), there was a 
significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for the positive 
accuracy condition (M = 7.94 x 10-7, SD = 1.78 x 10-7) and positive occurrence (M = 6.03 
x 10-7, SD = 1.34 x 10-7); t(196) = -12.02, p = .000; (d = 1.43). There was a significant 
difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = 7.94 x 
10-7, SD = 1.78 x 10-7) and negative occurrence (M = -1.81 x 10-7, SD = 1.70 x 10-7); 




hemoglobin concentration for positive occurrence (M = 6.03 x 10-7, SD = 1.34 x 10-7) and 
negative accuracy (M = 5.75 x 10-7, SD =1.19 x 10-7); t(196) = 5.24, p = .000; (d = 0.29). 
There was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for 
negative occurrence (M = -1.81 x 10-7, SD = 1.70 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = 5.75 
x 10-7, SD = 1.19 x 10-7); t(195) = -57.83, p = .000; (d = 5.15). These findings are shown 
in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. 
Channel 5,2 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing feedback about 
accuracy and occurrence. 




t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Cohen’s d 




-12.02 195 .000** 1.43 




    




63.46 195 .000** 5.60 




    




5.24 195 .000** 0.29 




    




-57.83 195 .000** 5.15 




    
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ = 
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory 




Does Oxygenated Hemoglobin Concentration and Location Differ Between 
Confirmatory and Disconfirmatory Feedback Conditions? 
 To address the second research question asking whether the level and location of 
oxygenated hemoglobin in the confirmatory feedback conditions differs from the 
disconfirmatory feedback conditions, Student’s paired-samples t-tests were conducted to 
compare the peak beta coefficients across positive accuracy and negative accuracy 
conditions, and positive occurrence and negative occurrence conditions. For channel 1,1, 
there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for 
positive occurrence (M = 1.41 x 10-8, SD = 2.92 x 10-8) and negative occurrence (M = 
3.47 x 10-7, SD = 1.43 x 10-7); t(195) = -31.18, p = .000; (d = 3.23). There was no 
significant difference between positive accuracy (M = 1.68 x 10-7, SD = 1.25 x 10-7) and 
















Channel 1,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes for confirmatory vs. 
disconfirmatory social feedback. 




t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Cohen’s d 




-31.18 195 .000** 3.23 




    




-1.57 195 .119 0.17 




    
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ = 
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory 
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.  
 
 For channel 2,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin 
concentration for positive occurrence (M = 1.76 x 10-7, SD = 9.60 x 10-8) and negative 
occurrence (M = 2.03 x 10-7, SD = 1.03 x 10-7); t(195) = -2.29, p = .023; (d = 0.27). There 
was also a significant difference between positive accuracy (M = -1.15 x 10-8, SD = 8.50 
x 10-8) and negative accuracy (M = 5.84 x 10-8, SD = 5.75 x 10-8); t(195) = -14.47, p = 










Channel 2,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes for confirmatory vs. 
disconfirmatory social feedback. 




t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Cohen’s d 




-2.29 195 .023* 0.27 




    




-14.47 195 .000** 0.96 




    
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ = 
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory 
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.  
  
 For channel 3,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin 
concentration for positive occurrence (M = -2.45 x 10-7, SD = 1.10 x 10-7) and negative 
occurrence (M = -5.54 x 10-8, SD = 4.83 x 10-8); t(195) = -22.36, p = .000; (d = 2.23). 
There was also a significant difference between positive accuracy (M = -2.18 x 10-7, SD = 
8.51 x 10-8) and negative accuracy (M = -2.50 x 10-7, SD = 8.88 x 10-8); t(195) = 3.58, p = 










Channel 3,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes for confirmatory vs. 
disconfirmatory social feedback. 




t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Cohen’s d 




-22.36 195 .000** 2.23 




    




3.58 195 .000** 0.37 




    
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ = 
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory 
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.  
 
 For channel 4,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin 
concentration for positive occurrence (M = 5.86 x 10-9, SD = 1.16 x 10-7) and negative 
occurrence (M = 9.99 x 10-8, SD = 8.04 x 10-8); t(195) = -10.14, p = .000; (d = 0.94). 
There was also a significant difference between positive accuracy (M = 3.38 x 10-7, SD = 
1.18 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = 8.40 x 10-8, SD = 9.65 x 10-8); t(195) = 29.01, p 










Channel 4,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes for confirmatory vs. 
disconfirmatory social feedback. 




t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Cohen’s d 




-10.14 195 .000** 0.94 




    




29.01 195 .000** 2.36 




    
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ = 
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory 
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.  
 
 For channel 4,2, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin 
concentration for positive occurrence (M = 2.45 x 10-7, SD = 6.42 x 10-8) and negative 
occurrence (M = -2.08 x 10-7, SD = 2.59 x 10-7); t(195) = 31.18, p = .000; (d = 0.94). 
There was also a significant difference between positive accuracy (M = 4.22 x 10-7, SD = 
9.55 x 10-9) and negative accuracy (M = 2.90 x 10-8, SD = 1.11 x 10-7); t(195) = 105.76, p 










Channel 4,2 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes for confirmatory vs. 
disconfirmatory social feedback. 




t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Cohen’s d 




-10.14 195 .000** 0.94 




    




29.01 195 .000** 2.36 




    
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ = 
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory 
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.  
 
 For channel 5,2, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin 
concentration for positive occurrence (M = 6.03 x 10-7, SD = 1.34 x 10-7) and negative 
occurrence (M = -1.81 x 10-7, SD = 1.69 x 10-7); t(195) = 65.69, p = .000; (d = 5.14). 
There was also a significant difference between positive accuracy (M = 7.94 x 10-7, SD = 
1.78 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = 5.75 x 10-7, SD = 1.19 x 10-7); t(195) = 13.17, p 










Channel 5,2 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes for confirmatory vs. 
disconfirmatory social feedback. 




t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Cohen’s d 




65.68 195 .000** 5.14 




    




13.17 195 .000** 1.45 




    
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ = 
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory 
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.  
 
Analysis of Belief in Occurrence Behavioural Data 
 Belief in occurrence scores for the two rating items are presented in Table 15 and 
Figure 10. There were no statistically significant differences between the pre-feedback 
belief in occurrence ratings across the five within-subjects’ feedback conditions. Ratings 
for control items significantly changed upon re-rating. Mean difference = .34 [95% CI, 
.03, .65 ]; (d = .37).  
 When participants were given positive feedback about memory occurrence, belief 
in occurrence scores increased by 0.34 points on the scale [95% CI, -.05, .73]; (d = .35). 
When they were given positive feedback about memory accuracy, belief in occurrence 
scores increased by 0.50 points on the scale [95% CI, .18, .82]; (d = .47). When they were 




by 1.54 points on the scale [95% CI, -2.22, -.87]; (d = .80). When they were given 
negative feedback about memory accuracy, belief in occurrence scores increased by 0.22 
points [95% CI, -.04, .48]; (d = .20). Change scores for both belief in accuracy and belief 
in occurrence are shown in Figure 11. 
Table 15. 
Pre- and post-social feedback belief in occurrence scores. 














Control 6.29 [5.97-6.62] 6.63 [6.32-6.95] .34* [.03, -.65] .37 
+ Occurrence 6.25 [5.91-6.59] 6.59 [6.24-6.93] .34 [-.05, .73] .35 
+ Accuracy 6.21 [5.84-6.57] 6.71 [6.32-7.09] .50* [.18, .82] .47 
- Occurrence 6.26 [5.83-6.70] 4.72 [3.86-5.58] -1.54* [-2.22, -.87] .80 
- Accuracy 6.16 [5.79-6.54] 6.38 [6.01-6.76] .22 [-.04, .48] .20 
Note. Feedback types are denoted by + (positive) or – (negative). Significance is bolded 
and denoted by an asterisk (*).  
 
Figure 10. Graph depicting belief in occurrence average rating scores before and after 
























Figure 11. Graph depicting belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy change scores 
(post-feedback - pre-feedback) and 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Analysis of Belief in Accuracy Behavioural Data 
 Belief in accuracy scores for the two rating items are presented in Table 16 and 
Figure 12. There were no statistically significant differences between the pre-feedback 
belief in accuracy ratings across the five within-subjects’ feedback conditions. Ratings 
for control items significantly changed upon re-rating. Mean difference = .35 [95% CI, 
.04, .67]; (d = .27).  
 When participants were given positive feedback about memory occurrence, belief 
in accuracy scores increased by 0.24 points on the scale [95% CI, -.12, .60]; (d = .35). 
When they were given positive feedback about memory accuracy, belief in accuracy 
scores increased by 0.54 points on the scale [95% CI, .15, .94]; (d = .44). When they were 

































Change Scores by Feedback Condition
Average Change in Belief in
Accuracy Ratings





by 1.15 points on the scale [95% CI, -1.67, -.62]; (d = .63). When they were given 
negative feedback about memory accuracy, belief in accuracy scores decreased by 0.75 
points [95% CI, -1.20, -.29]; (d = .53). Change scores for both belief in accuracy and 
belief in occurrence are shown in Figure 11. 
 
Table 16. 
Pre- and post-social feedback belief in accuracy scores. 













Control 5.27 [4.77-5.75] 5.62 [5.21-6.03] .35* [.04, .67] .27 
+ Occurrence 5.20 [4.73-5.68] 5.44 [4.97-5.92] .24 [-.12, .60] .17 
+ Accuracy 5.32 [4.87-5.78] 5.86 [5.45-6.28] .54* [.15, .94] .44 
- Occurrence 5.25 [4.68-5.82] 4.10 [3.40-4.80] -1.15* [-1.67, -.62] .63 
- Accuracy 5.15 [4.63-5.67] 4.40 [3.93-4.86] -.75* [-1.20, -.29] .53 
Note. Feedback types are denoted by + (positive) or – (negative). Significance is bolded 







Figure 12. Graph depicting belief in accuracy average rating scores before and after 
receiving each type of social feedback with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Analysis of Relinquishment, Partial Relinquishment, and Non-Relinquishment of 
Memory 
Behavioural Analysis 
 All 17 participants were separated into relinquishment type categories: 6 were 
categorized as relinquishers, 5 were categorized as non-relinquishers, and 6 were 
categorized as partial relinquishers. Partial relinquishers were further sub-divided into 
“relinquished belief in occurrence”, “relinquished belief in accuracy”, or “unclear 




























Participant relinquishment types and sub-types 










Relinquisher 6 08.B2; 17.A1; 
18.B1; 19.A2; 
24.B2; 25.A1. 
   
Partial 
Relinquisher 
















Non-Relinquisher 5 02.B1; 04.B2; 
11.A2; 12.B2; 
23.A2. 
   
 
 Table 18 denotes relinquishment type and response to each instance of social 
challenge. In order to be placed into the “relinquisher” category, the participant had to 
show a decrease from their pre-feedback score after every instance of disconfirmatory 
social feedback across the four instances of negative feedback, with a decrease being 
defined as a change of -0.5 points or more for this study. In order to be placed in the 
“non-relinquisher” category, the participant had to show either no change or an increase 
in their score after every instance of disconfirmatory social feedback on the four 
























2.B1 No No No No Non-Relinquisher  
4.B2 No No No No Non-Relinquisher  




8.B2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Relinquisher  
11.A2 No No No No Non-Relinquisher  
12.B2 No No No No Non-Relinquisher  









17.A1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Relinquisher  
18.B1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Relinquisher  
19.A2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Relinquisher  














23.A2 No No No No Non-Relinquisher  
24.B2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Relinquisher  
25.A1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Relinquisher  
Note. Each participant was challenged for their belief in their memory occurrence and 
memory accuracy two times (as shown in columns 2-5). Average belief in occurrence and 
belief in accuracy change scores were used to denote each participant as “yes” or “no” in 
each row. Participants had to show at least a 0.5-point decrease on belief in accuracy 
items when challenged about memory accuracy or at least a 0.5-point decrease on belief 
in occurrence items when challenged about memory occurrence to be deemed as a 




Partial relinquishers showed either relinquishment of only belief in accuracy and not 
belief in occurrence (“relinquished belief in accuracy” subtype), relinquishment of belief 
in occurrence and not belief in accuracy (“relinquished belief in occurrence” subtype), or 
an unclear pattern of relinquishment, whereby they relinquished belief in accuracy on one 
instance of challenge but not on the other (“unclear belief in accuracy” subtype).  
 
Analysis of Exploratory fNIRS Findings 
 To address the exploratory portion of the second research question assessing 
whether the level and location of oxygenated hemoglobin differs between participants 
who relinquish their belief in their memory and participants who maintain their belief in 
their memory, independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare the peak beta 
coefficients across the three different relinquishment types: relinquisher, partial 
relinquisher, and non-relinquisher. These differences are compared for both types of 
disconfirmatory feedback (occurrence and accuracy), across each channel.  
 For channel 1,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin 
concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback about the 
occurrence of their memory and relinquished belief (M = 9.44 x 10-7, SD = 1.50 x 10-7) 
and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = 6.72 x 10-8, SD = 9.24 x 10-8); 
t(390) = 69.58, p = .000; (d = 7.04). There was also a significant difference between those 
who relinquished belief (M = 9.44 x 10-7, SD = 1.50 x 10-7) and did not relinquish belief 
(M = -1.98 x 10-7, SD = 1.02 x 10-7); t(390) = 87.91, p = .000; (d = 8.90). Finally, there 




(M = 6.72 x 10-8, SD = 9.24 x 10-8) and those who did not relinquish belief (M = -1.98 x 
10-7, SD = 1.02 x 10-7); t(390) = 26.88; (d = 2.73). These findings are shown in Table 19.  
Table 19. 
Channel 1,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about 
memory occurrence 












69.58 390 .000** 7.04 
 Partial 
Relinquisher 




    




87.91 390 .000** 8.90 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 3 Partial 
Relinquisher 




26.88 390 .000** 2.73 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
 
 When looking at channel 1,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated 
hemoglobin concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback 
about the accuracy of their memory and relinquished belief (M = -5.36 x 10-8, SD = 3.98 
x 10-8) and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = 4.30 x 10-7, SD = 4.34 x 10-
8); t(390) = -115.06, p = .000; (d = 11.63). There was also a significant difference 
between those who relinquished belief (M = -5.36 x 10-8, SD = 3.98 x 10-8) and did not 
relinquish belief (M = 2.20 x 10-7, SD = 1.52 x 10-7); t(390) = -24.43, p = .000; (d = 2.46). 
Finally, there was also a significant difference between participants who partially 
relinquished belief (M = 4.30 x 10-7, SD = 4.34 x 10-8) and those who did not relinquish 
belief (M = 2.20 x 10-7, SD = 1.52 x 10-7); t(390) = 18.61; (d = 1.88). These findings are 





Channel 1,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about 
memory accuracy 












-115.06 390 .000** 11.63 
 Partial 
Relinquisher 




    




-24.43 390 .000** 2.46 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 3 Partial 
Relinquisher 




18.61 390 .000** 1.88 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
 
 For channel 2,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin 
concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback about the 
occurrence of their memory and relinquished belief (M = 2.85 x 10-7, SD = 2.90 x 10-7) 
and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = -1.49 x 10-6, SD = 1.19 x 10-7); 
t(390) = 79.52, p = .000; (d = 6.02). There was also a significant difference between those 
who relinquished belief (M = 2.85 x 10-7, SD = 2.90 x 10-7) and did not relinquish belief 
(M = -2.08 x 10-7, SD = 1.05 x 10-7); t(390) = 22.34, p = .000; (d = 2.26). Finally, there 
was also a significant difference between participants who partially relinquished belief 
(M = -1.49 x 10-6, SD = 1.19 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief (M = -2.08 x 








Channel 2,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about 
memory occurrence 












79.52 390 .000** 6.02 
 Partial 
Relinquisher 




    




22.34 390 .000** 2.26 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 3 Partial 
Relinquisher 




-114.02 390 .000** 7.50 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
 
 Also for channel 2,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated 
hemoglobin concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback 
about the accuracy of their memory and relinquished belief (M = 1.19 x 10-6, SD = 6.50 x 
10-8) and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = 5.45 x 10-7, SD = 1.09 x 10-7); 
t(390) = 70.88, p = .000; (d = 7.19). There was also a significant difference between those 
who relinquished belief (M = 1.19 x 10-6, SD = 6.50 x 10-8) and did not relinquish belief 
(M = 1.44 x 10-8, SD = 1.55 x 10-7); t(390) = 97.79, p = .000; (d = 9.89). Finally, there 
was also a significant difference between participants who partially relinquished belief 
(M = 5.45 x 10-7, SD = 1.09 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief (M = 1.44 x 







Channel 2,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about 
memory accuracy 












70.88 390 .000** 7.19 
 Partial 
Relinquisher 




    




97.79 390 .000** 9.89 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 3 Partial 
Relinquisher 




39.16 390 .000** 3.96 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
 
 For channel 3,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin 
concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback about the 
occurrence of their memory and relinquished belief (M = 1.26 x 10-7, SD = 6.95 x 10-8) 
and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = 4.69 x 10-8, SD = 1.03 x 10-7); 
t(390) = 8.87, p = .000; (d = 0.90). There was also a significant difference between those 
who relinquished belief (M = 1.26 x 10-7, SD = 6.95 x 10-8) and did not relinquish belief 
(M = -2.24 x 10-7, SD = 3.38 x 10-8); t(390) = 63.42, p = .000; (d = 6.41). Finally, there 
was also a significant difference between participants who partially relinquished belief 
(M = 4.69 x 10-8, SD = 1.03 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief (M = -2.24 x 








Channel 3,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about 
memory occurrence 












8.87 390 .000** 0.9 
 Partial 
Relinquisher 




    




63.42 390 .000** 6.41 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 3 Partial 
Relinquisher 




35.03 390 .000** 3.53 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
 
 Again, when looking at channel 3,1, there was a significant difference in the 
oxygenated hemoglobin concentration between participants who received 
disconfirmatory feedback about the accuracy of their memory and relinquished belief (M 
= -1.69 x 10-7, SD = 1.76 x 10-7) and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = 
2.27 x 10-7, SD = 8.15 x 10-8); t(390) = -28.68, p = .000; (d = 2.89). There was also a 
significant difference between those who relinquished belief (M = -1.69 x 10-7, SD = 1.76 
x 10-7) and did not relinquish belief (M = -1.34 x 10-8, SD = 1.59 x 10-7); t(390) = -9.21, p 
= .000; (d = 0.93). Finally, there was also a significant difference between participants 
who partially relinquished belief (M = 2.27 x 10-7, SD = 8.15 x 10-8) and those who did 
not relinquish belief (M = -1.34 x 10-8, SD = 1.59 x 10-7); t(390) = 18.87; (d = 1.90). 







Channel 3,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about 
memory accuracy 












-28.68 390 .000** 2.89 
 Partial 
Relinquisher 




    




-9.21 390 .000** 0.93 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 3 Partial 
Relinquisher 




18.87 390 .000** 1.90 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
  
 For channel 4,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin 
concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback about the 
occurrence of their memory and relinquished belief (M = 2.91 x 10-7, SD = 2.90 x 10-7) 
and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = -2.57 x 10-7, SD = 1.02 x 10-7); 
t(390) = 24.99, p = .000; (d = 2.52). There was also a significant difference between those 
who relinquished belief (M = 2.91 x 10-7, SD = 2.90 x 10-7) and did not relinquish belief 
(M = -5.24 x 10-7, SD = 9.57 x 10-8); t(390) = 37.37, p = .000; (d = 3.78). Finally, there 
was also a significant difference between participants who partially relinquished belief 
(M = -2.57 x 10-7, SD = 1.02 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief (M = -5.24 x 







Channel 4,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about 
memory occurrence 












24.99 390 .000** 2.52 
 Partial 
Relinquisher 




    




37.37 390 .000** 3.78 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 3 Partial 
Relinquisher 




26.68 390 .000** 2.71 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
 
 Again, when looking at channel 4,1, there was a significant difference between 
participants who partially relinquished belief (M = -9.71 x 10-8, SD = 1.01 x 10-7) and 
those who did not relinquish belief (M = 3.78 x 10-8, SD = 2.02 x 10-7); t(390) = -8.37; (d 
= 0.85). Unfortunately, due to poor signal quality, channel 4,1’s results were unavailable 













Channel 4,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about 
memory accuracy 








Pair 1 Relinquisher - - - - - -  
 Partial 
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 2 Relinquisher - - - - - -  
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 3 Partial 
Relinquisher 




-8.37 390 .000** 0.85 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
 
 For channel 4,2, there was no significant difference between participants who 
partially relinquished belief when given disconfirmatory feedback about memory 
occurrence (M = 2.69 x 10-7, SD = 3.07 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief (M 
= 2.82 x 10-7, SD = 5.09 x 10-8); t(390) = -0.59; (d = 1.10). Unfortunately, due to poor 
signal quality, channel 4,2’s results were unavailable for the “relinquisher” group. These 












Channel 4,2 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about 
memory occurrence 








Pair 1 Relinquisher - - - - - -  
 Partial 
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 2 Relinquisher - - - - - -  
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 3 Partial 
Relinquisher 




-.59 390 .553 1.10 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
 
 Again, when looking at channel 4,2, there was a significant difference between 
participants who partially relinquished belief when given disconfirmatory feedback about 
memory accuracy (M = 1.47 x 10-8, SD = 1.47 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish 
belief (M = 6.54 x 10-8, SD = 1.76 x 10-7); t(390) = -3.10, p = .002; (d = 0.31). 
Unfortunately, due to poor signal quality, channel 4,2’s results were unavailable for the 












Channel 4,2 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about 
memory accuracy 








Pair 1 Relinquisher - - - - - -  
 Partial 
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 2 Relinquisher - - - - - -  
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 3 Partial 
Relinquisher 




-3.10 390 .002* 0.31 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
 
 For channel 5,2, there was a significant difference between participants who 
partially relinquished belief when given disconfirmatory feedback about memory 
occurrence (M = -1.97 x 10-7, SD = 1.76 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief 
(M = 1.89 x 10-7, SD = 7.02 x 10-8); t(390) = -28.56, p = .000; (d = 2.88). Unfortunately, 
due to poor signal quality, channel 4,2’s results were unavailable for the “relinquisher” 












Channel 5,2 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about 
memory occurrence 








Pair 1 Relinquisher - - - - - - - 
 Partial 
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 2 Relinquisher - - - - - - - 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 3 Partial 
Relinquisher 




-28.56 390 .000** 2.88 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
 
 When looking at channel 5,2, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated 
hemoglobin concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback 
about the accuracy of their memory and relinquished belief (M = -9.15 x 10-7, SD = 2.02 
x 10-7)and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = 1.17 x 10-6, SD = 1.47 x 10-
7); t(390) = -116.90, p = .000; (d = 11.80). There was a significant difference between 
those who relinquished belief (M = -1.69 x 10-7, SD = 1.76 x 10-7) and did not relinquish 
belief (M = 5.03 x 10-8, SD = 4.99 x 10-8); t(390) = -65.03, p = .000; (d = 6.56). Finally, 
there was also a significant difference between participants who partially relinquished 
belief (M = 1.17 x 10-6, SD = 1.47 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief (M = 
5.03 x 10-8, SD = 4.99 x 10-8); t(390) = 100.90, p = .000; (d = 10.20). These findings are 





Channel 5,2 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about 
memory accuracy. 












-116.90 390 .000** 11.80 
 Partial 
Relinquisher 




    




-65.03 390 .000** 6.56 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
Pair 3 Partial 
Relinquisher 




100.90 390 .000** 10.20 
 Non-
Relinquisher 




    
 
 Using AtlasViewer GUI (Aasted et al., 2015), activation maps were generated 
using oxy-hemoglobin (HbO) concentration data from between 5-10 seconds of the 
hemodynamic response function (HRF). Figure 13 and 14 represent participants who 
were deemed to be “relinquishers”, Figure 15 and 16 represent participants who were 
deemed to be “partial-relinquishers”, and Figure 17 and 18 represent participants who 





Figure 13. Participants denoted as “Relinquishers” when given disconfirmatory feedback 








Figure 14. Participants denoted as “Relinquishers” when given disconfirmatory feedback 











Figure 15. Participants denoted as “Partial Relinquishers” when given disconfirmatory 











Figure 16. Participants denoted as “Partial Relinquishers” when given disconfirmatory 











Figure 17. Participants denoted as “Non-Relinquishers” when given disconfirmatory 











Figure 18. Participants denoted as “Non-Relinquishers” when given disconfirmatory 












Summary of Major Findings 
 The current study aimed to investigate the neurocognitive mechanisms that 
contribute to one’s metamemorial appraisals of their memory accuracy and memory 
occurrence using a functional neuroimaging device. Past research has shown that despite 
being rated highly synonymously in laboratory settings, certain forms of questioning can 
create a dissociation of one’s belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence appraisals, 
suggesting that they may in fact be distinct processes (Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 
2015; Korcsog, 2017; Korcsog, 2018; Korcsog et al. In Preparation). In other words, it 
has been shown that one can believe that their memory occurred without thinking their 
recollection is accurate, and one can believe that their memory is accurate, even if they 
no longer believe it to have occurred. Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) is 
commonly utilized in studies investigating the cognitive underpinnings of human 
behaviour, largely because it maintains more ecological validity than other neuroimaging 
modalities (Pinti et al., 2018). Because of this, fNIRS was utilized within this study to 
measure participants’ brain activity when receiving different types of social feedback 
about their memory.  
 The first research question addressed whether one’s appraisals of their memory 
occurrence differs from their appraisals of their memory accuracy when given 
confirmatory or disconfirmatory social feedback from an examiner. As demonstrated by 
Scoboria, Talarico and Pascal (2015), Korcsog (2017), Korcsog (2018), and Korcsog et 




dependent upon the type of feedback given. In the current study, belief in accuracy and 
belief in occurrence ratings dissociated when participants received disconfirmatory social 
feedback about memory accuracy, thus replicating the findings of Korcsog et al. (In 
Preparation). When looking at the functional neuroimaging findings, we see that there is 
a significant difference in neuronal activation across almost the entire left prefrontal 
cortical array (BA 8, 9, 10, and 45) when comparing all types of feedback about memory 
occurrence and memory accuracy. This suggests that the neurocognitive mechanisms at 
play are quite different when comparing one’s appraisal of how accurate their memory is 
versus whether or not that memory occurred, regardless of whether or not that memory is 
deemed to be accurate or inaccurate by another person.  
 More specifically, when comparing the brain activity associated with one’s 
appraisals of memory accuracy and memory occurrence qualitatively, we can see 
differential patterns of activation across the AtlasViewer GUI-generated activation maps 
(Figure 19). When participants were presented with feedback about their memory 
occurrence, there seems to be increased activation in the vicinity of the inferior frontal 
gyrus (BA 45; channel 5,2), whereas feedback about memory accuracy seemed to differ 
based upon whether the feedback was confirmatory or disconfirmatory. Disconfirmatory 
social feedback about memory accuracy showed a relative increase in activity in the 
inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45; channel 5,2), much like feedback about memory 
occurrence did. On the other hand, confirmatory social feedback about memory accuracy 





Figure 19. A comprehensive summary of the brain activity associated with each of the 
five feedback conditions, mapped onto a 3D brain model using AtlasViewer GUI.  
 
 The second research question aimed to further investigate the distinction between 




confirmatory social feedback about the occurrence of a scene, their ratings of their 
memory accuracy and memory occurrence stayed largely the same as before they 
received feedback, likely due to the ceiling effects of already having rated their memory 
as being accurate and having occurred on the 7-point Likert-type scale. When participants 
received confirmatory feedback about their memory accuracy however, there was an 
increase in both belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence ratings, largely due to the fact 
that telling someone that they remembered the details of a scene accurately would 
confirm that the scene did in fact occur. Alternatively, when participants were given 
disconfirmatory feedback about their memory’s occurrence or accuracy, a decision-
making process would presumably come into play. When participants were given 
disconfirmatory feedback about the occurrence of their memory, both their belief in 
accuracy and belief in occurrence ratings significantly decreased on average. When given 
disconfirmatory feedback about memory accuracy, belief in accuracy ratings significantly 
decreased however belief in occurrence ratings did not change. Again, this is presumably 
due to the fact that telling someone that “they got less than 50% of the details correct” 
would confirm that a scene was in fact presented. However, it is notable that 
confirmatory feedback about memory accuracy actually increased belief in occurrence 
ratings, whereas confirmatory feedback about memory accuracy did not cause a 
significant change from pre-feedback scores.  
 When looking at the fNIRS findings comparing confirmatory feedback about 
memory occurrence to disconfirmatory feedback about memory occurrence, we see a 
difference in activation across nearly all of the channels. As well, when comparing 




memory accuracy, there is a statistical difference across nearly all of the channels. It is 
notable however, that channel 1,1 (BA 8; medial prefrontal cortex) did not show a 
difference between confirmatory and disconfirmatory feedback about accuracy, and there 
were small effect sizes for channels 2,1 (BA 9; dorsolateral/anterior prefrontal cortex) 
and 3,1 (BA 9; dorsolateral/anterior prefrontal cortex) when comparing confirmatory and 
disconfirmatory feedback about accuracy. As shown in Figure 19, the 3D-generated 
activation maps seem to show a higher concentration of oxygenated hemoglobin when 
participants are presented with disconfirmatory feedback about memory occurrence than 
when given confirmatory feedback about memory occurrence across the inferior frontal 
gyrus. As well, when participants were given disconfirmatory social feedback about 
memory accuracy, activation was greater across the inferior frontal gyrus when compared 
to confirmatory feedback about memory accuracy. Although the inferior frontal gyrus is 
largely known for its involvement in language processing and speech production, it is 
also thought to play a role in elaborate attentional and working memory processing such 
as fast and accurate responding and the elaborate processing required to increase 
accuracy (Tops & Boksem, 2011).Because of the variability in relinquishment patterns 
seen when participants received disconfirmatory social feedback in general, and in further 
exploration of the second research question, participants were separated into 
threecategories based upon their change in rating scale scores (full relinquishers, partial 
relinquishers, and non-relinquishers).  
 The level and location of activation largely differed between relinquishers, partial 
relinquishers, and non-relinquishers, both when given disconfirmatory feedback about 




very large, suggesting that there is a substantial difference in activation patterns between 
groups. Channel 4,2 (BA 10; anterior prefrontal cortex) was the only channel that did not 
show a significant difference between partial relinquishers and non-relinquishers when 
given disconfirmatory feedback about memory occurrence. However, this region showed 
a medium effect size when given disconfirmatory feedback about memory accuracy. 
Because there was significant variability within the “partial relinquishers” category 
across how they relinquished (i.e., whether they relinquished only belief in occurrence, 
only belief in accuracy, or if it was an unclear relinquishment pattern), results comparing 
this category to “relinquishers” or “non-relinquishers” should be taken with caution. A 
recent study by Pinti et al. (2020) explored the role of the prefrontal cortex (BA 10) in 
face-to-face deception using fNIRS, and found that during situations involving close 
personal interactions, the anterior prefrontal cortex was involved in the processing of 
deception. These findings differ from the current study’s findings, as we tend to see less 
activation in the left anterior prefrontal cortex and more activation in the inferior frontal 
gyrus during the deceptive conditions. However, Pinti et al. (2020) used a much different 
deception paradigm, whereby the participants knew the task would involve lying and lie 
detection, rather than the current study’s paradigm of being naïve to the deceptive 
component. 
Limitations 
 The aim of the current study was to investigate the underlying neurocognitive 
mechanisms that contribute to one’s appraisals of their memory. While this task was 
accomplished by comparing the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration in several left 




vs. feedback about occurrence; confirmatory feedback vs. disconfirmatory feedback), 
limitations to the study should be highlighted. First, with regards to the study design, it is 
pertinent to discuss whether watching or listening to a scene of an actress performing 
simple tasks and then receiving social feedback is demonstrative of social feedback for 
one’s own autobiographical memory. While it is true that the act of a participant 
watching or listening to a scene and then remembering themselves being exposed to that 
scene is technically an autobiographical memory, targeting one’s own personal memories 
or even scenes recorded in the first person would arguably be much more demonstrative 
of the cognitive processes attributed to true autobiographical memory due to the addition 
of an emotional and self-relevant component.   
 Further, another methodological limitation can be seen in the wording of the 
feedback given regarding memory accuracy. Telling someone that they remembered less 
than 50% of the details correctly leaves room for multiple interpretations such as “I 
remembered approximately half of the scene correctly” or “I remembered very little of 
the scene correctly”. As well, providing this kind of feedback about memory accuracy 
solidifies that the scene in question did in fact occur, thus influencing belief in occurrence 
ratings. Following this, the “feedback” portion of the study took place in a small, dark 
room where the participant’s brain activity was being recorded by the fNIRS machine, 
and there were long delays between instruction to ensure that the machine was recording 
the entirety of the hemodynamic response. It is possible that participants could have been 
clued-in to the fact that the researchers were more interested in this portion of the study, 
thus allowing for the deceptive component to be spoiled. This adds another limitation 




strength, participants who guessed the purpose of the study when asked “what do you 
think we are studying today?” were not removed. However, this limitation is largely 
remedied by the exploratory portion of the study which separated participants based upon 
relinquishment type, as those participants who knew they were being deceived were 
either placed in the partial or non-relinquishment categories. This also draws upon the 
limitation of the small sample size, which did not allow for a comparison of the “partial 
relinquisher” sub-categories. Although the proposed sample size was met, it is 
recommended that future studies collect a larger sample to account for signal detection 
problems and individual differences in relinquishment pattern.  
 Apart from methodological limitations, fNIRS-specific limitations are also 
pertinent to this discussion. In addition to the limitations of fNIRS outlined in the 
introduction of this thesis, there were study-specific fNIRS limitations for this research 
project. First, as mentioned, the nature of an fNIRS-based study lends itself to potentially 
upsetting research with a deceptive component, adding an obvious indication that 
something important is occurring during the time of recording.  
 As mentioned by Pinti et al. (2019), the pre-processing pipeline across fNIRS 
studies is currently heterogeneous, meaning that the different filtering and functional 
techniques used can drastically affect the data before performing statistical analyses. This 
increases the probability of problems in the replicability of the study, especially when the 
different systems, the different software, and the different researchers at differing levels 
of expertise are factored in (Pfiefer et al., 2018). As well, due to the highly correlated 
nature of fNIRS noise data (Huppert, 2016), statistical assumptions are often violated. 




it is also up to the researcher whether or not to use the mean HRF beta coefficients 
produced by the linear regression analysis, or the “peak” beta coefficients produced by 
the linear regression analysis (as used in this study). The researcher’s choice of which of 
the two to use can result in completely different findings. 
 Lastly, the use of the 10/20 system in the absence of digitizing procedures reduces 
the precision with which determinations about cortical location can be made. The 10/20 
system has been regarded to be a tedious and error-prone procedure that involves both the 
manual measurement and marking of 10/20 landmarks on the head of the participant, thus 
making it difficult for the researcher to maintain high reliability. To address these issues, 
semi-automatic approaches should be used in the future, such as Xiao et al. (2017)’s 
proposed method. Consequently, we refrained from drawing strong conclusions about the 
neural representation of these processes.  
Future Directions 
 Following the aforementioned limitations to this study, there are a few avenues 
pertinent for exploration in the future. First and foremost, these findings should be 
replicated in order to solidify the findings as reliable and valid. It would also be pertinent 
to increase the sample size in order to be able to parse out the difference in activation 
patterns of the “partial relinquishers” sub-groups. 
 To address the limitation of the study’s scenes not reflecting one’s own personal 
autobiographical memories, it would be interesting to conduct a study using virtual 
reality scenes filmed in the first-person in order to mimic the act of doing each of the 
tasks. This way, it would seem as though the participant themselves were performing 




personal memories from participants’ family members could be another method, however 
it would be much more difficult to do-so given that they would have to be unaware of this 
exchange.  
 To address the limitation of the sterility of the fNIRS testing environment, it may 
be helpful to set up the fNIRS at the beginning of session two rather than only during the 
“feedback phase”. This way the entire session is deemed as being important to the study 
in the participant’s mind, making it less obvious as to what the ultimate purpose is, and 
potentially maintaining the deceptive component of the study.  
Implications 
 This line of research has increasingly strengthened the field’s understanding of 
the distinct underlying cognitive mechanisms contributing to memory reports. By better 
understanding the micro-components of one’s appraisals of their memory, we can more 
accurately capture and understand the overall implications on areas that rely heavily on 
memory reports such as judicial decision making, psychotherapy, and forensic 
interviewing. Contemporary discussions of social influences on remembering (Echterhoff 
& Hirst, 2009) can thus be enriched by considering what types of social feedback can 
influence the development and revision of event occurrence versus the sharing/editing 
/revision of memory for event details (see Brown et al., 2015; Foley, 2015; Scoboria, 
Nash & Mazzoni, 2017; and Sheen, Kemp & Rubin, 2001 for interesting examples). 
Conclusion 
 This study was the first to investigate the neurocognitive underpinnings of one’s 
memory appraisals when receiving different types of social feedback, and thus paves the 




prefrontal cortical activation patterns differed when participants were given social 
feedback about their memory accuracy and memory occurrence for simple scenes 
presented in a laboratory setting. As well, this activation differed based upon whether or 
not the social feedback was confirmatory or disconfirmatory/deceptive. It was also found 
that brain activity differed dependent on participants’ decision to maintain, relinquish, or 
partially relinquish belief in their memory. This suggests that based upon one’s pattern of 
brain activity when receiving social feedback, whether or not they are going to relinquish 
or maintain their memory could be estimated. Further, despite being rated highly 
synonymously in the literature and thus largely “lumped together” as one (Scoboria, 
Talarcio, & Pascal, 2015), findings demonstrating that belief in accuracy and belief in 
occurrence can be dissociated (Korcsog, 2017; Korcsog, 2018; Korcsog et al. 2020) are 
strengthened by this research, which concludes that belief in accuracy and belief in 
occurrence are neurologically distinct metamemorial appraisals and that decision-making 
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Appendix A: Belief in Occurrence and Belief in Accuracy Rating Items 
 
Belief in Occurrence 
1. How likely is it that this scene was presented?  
 (1 Definitely did not view; 7 Definitely viewed) 
 
2. It is true that this scene was presented.  
 (1 Not at all true; 7 Completely true)  
 
Belief in Accuracy 
3. How confident are you that your memory for this scene is accurate?  
 (1 Not at all confident; 7 Completely confident)  
 
4. What proportion of your memory for this scene is accurate?  







Appendix B: List of Presented Scenes 
 
1. A girl making a sandwich 
2. A girl washing her hands 
3. A girl painting a picture 
4. A girl styling a doll’s hair 
5. A girl painting someone’s nails 
6. A girl doing a puzzle 
7. A girl placing numbers in a foam board. 
8. A girl doing laundry  
9. A girl mixing liquids 
10. A girl picking a flower 
11. A girl sealing a letter to mail it 
12. A girl writing the numbers 0-10 on a 
piece of paper 
13. A girl blowing up a balloon 
14. A girl opening a present 
15. A girl putting on makeup 
16. A girl stretching 
17. A girl brushing her teeth 
18. A girl making a coffee 
19. A girl dressing a doll  
20. A girl eating dinner 
21. A girl making something out of clay 
22. A girl chewing bubble-gum 
23. A girl doing math problems 
24. A girl doing exercises 
25. A girl lighting candles 
26. A girl washing her face 
27. A girl dealing playing cards 
28. A girl colouring in a colouring book 
29. A girl setting the table 
30. A girl fixing a remote control 
 
31. A girl writing in a card 
32. A girl doing a craft 
33. A girl painting Christmas ornaments 
34. A girl cutting a snowflake out of paper 
35. A girl making a paper airplane 
36. A girl sorting coins 
37. A girl flipping through a textbook 
38. A girl putting tape on a bird house 
39. A girl bowling 
40. A girl putting on a rollerblade 
41. A girl brushing and braiding her hair 
42. A girl making a salad 
43. A girl making an ice cream sundae 
44. A girl sealing a letter to mail it  
45. A girl dancing 
46. A girl throwing a toy for her dog 
47. A girl kicking a soccer ball 
48. A girl making a phone call 
49. A girl making her bed 
50. A girl bouncing on a trampoline 
51. A girl making batter for a cake 
52. A girl placing coloured beads on to a 
string 
53. A girl drawing on a pumpkin 
54. A girl placing coloured circular stickers 
on paper 
55. A girl drawing a rainbow 
56. A girl making a dog do a trick 
57. A girl making tea 
58. A girl doing dishes 
59. A girl doing a cartwheel 













Appendix C: List of Scenes that Were Not Presented 
 
1. A girl cutting her nails 
2. A girl organizing her pencil case 
3. A girl playing games on an iPad 
4. A girl brushing a kitten 
5. A girl washing a car 
6. A girl sewing fabric 
7. A girl planting a flower in a garden 
8. A girl making a gingerbread house 
9. A girl flossing her teeth 
10. A girl drawing a family portrait 
11. A girl flying a kite 
12. A girl making a pillow fort 
13. A girl playing the piano 
14. A girl munching on cookies 
15. A girl opening and closing a window 
16. A girl cleaning the bathroom sink 
17. A girl playing a board game 
18. A girl pumping air into the tires of her bike 
19. A girl diving into a swimming pool 
20. A girl stapling paper together 
21. A girl studying for a test 
22. A girl playing bingo 
23. A girl writing her name 3 times 
24. A girl tracing her hand on a piece of paper 
25. A girl printing out pictures from a printer 
26. A girl sharpening a pencil and writing with it 
27. A girl using a calculator to solve a math 
problem 
28. A girl hammering a nail into a piece of wood 
29. A girl washing her windows with a squeegee 







Appendix D: Participant Pool Advertisement 
 
Title: Remembering Recorded Events  
Duration: 2 hours  
Bonus points: 3  
Description: If you volunteer to participate in this study, we will ask you to come to the 
lab and watch or listen to simple scenes (such as “making a sandwich”). One week later, 
we will ask you will complete a test of your memory for these scenes while your brain 
activity is being recorded using Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS). Both the 
first and second session will take 60 minutes to complete, for a total of no more than two 
hours of your time. Participants with auditory or visual impairments will not be able to 
participate. The second part of the study will take place in a small enclosed lab space, and 
we ask participants to provide access to scalp and skin. Participants are unable to wear 





Appendix E: Post-Study Debriefing 
So that was the last question I had for you. Now I’m just going to tell you a little bit more 
about the study.  
 First of all, thank you for participating. This study is examining how people make 
decisions about their memories for past events. While we might be tempted to think of 
our memories as fixed in our minds, research has shown that memories are continuously 
being influenced by new information and experiences that we have. This has led some 
researchers to study how people make decisions about memories when they encounter 
different types of information.  
 In this study, we were interested in seeing what people do when feedback is given 
that the accuracy or occurrence of their memories are incorrect. In this study there were 
two phases. First, you studied many different simple scenes – some you watched and 
some you heard.  
 The second phase, the memory test, occurred today. You may recall that after you 
completed the memory test there were a few times that I gave you feedback that your 
memory was incorrect. For some of the memory test items, your memory may have been 
incorrect – you might have missed key details within scenes, or included details that were 
not actually there in your descriptions. You also may have said that a scene was presented 
when it was not, or said that a scene was not presented when it was. However, the 
feedback I gave you that your memory was incorrect during the second phase (when you 
were being recorded with the fNIRS) today was false. We are interested in seeing how 
people react to feedback that strong memories are incorrect. In this study, we were 
specifically examining how often people reject versus how often they accept the 
feedback, and how your brain activity differs dependent on the type of social feedback 
you received. The Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy allows us to be able to do just 
that, by measuring changes in blood flow in your brain.  
 So, there was a type of deception in this research. For a small number of scenes 
that you correctly identified as being seen, the feedback that I gave you was incorrect. 
Those scenes were name scenes given feedback condition 3 or 4. We apologize for the 
need for the deception, but there really is no way to study how people respond to 
feedback from others without sometimes contradicting accurate memories. With that 
being said, it is important to note that this study was not measuring memory accuracy, 
nor does susceptibility to social feedback or challenges tell us anything about your 
memory ability.  
 Now that you know about the study, do you consent to the use of your data?  Do 
you have any questions, or anything else that you would like to tell us about what it was 
like for you to participate in this study?  




Appendix F: Transcribed Example of Audio Description 
 
“So, there was a woman standing in a kitchen and she had a piece of bread and she was 
cutting it with a knife. Um, and then she uh, she had to pull it apart. A-and it wasn’t like 
totally even. And then uh, she had some stuff she was putting on it. So, I think there was 
meat and cheese, and then she had condiments so there was some ketchup. And, uh that 





Appendix G: Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
Title of Study: Remembering Recorded Events 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Kassandra Korcsog and Dr. Chris Abeare, 
Department of Psychology, University of Windsor. If you have any questions or concerns about the research, 
please feel to contact Kassandra Korcsog korcsog@uwindsor.ca or Dr. Abeare at cabeare@uwindsor.ca. This 
study is being conducted to satisfy the requirements of Kassandra Korcsog’s Master’s thesis.   
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to examine aspects of memory for recorded scenes, and associated neurology 
using Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS), a safe, non-invasive method of recording blood flow in 
the brain via infrared light that is shone through the skull and then detected. This is similar to shining a flashlight 
through one’s hand.  
 
PROCEDURE 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, we will ask you to watch or listen to a series of recorded scenes 
(e.g. an actor making a sandwich). One week later, you will complete a memory test. This session will be 
audio recorded and your brain activity will be measured using Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS). 
The first session will take 60 minutes to complete, and the second session will take 60 minutes, for a total of 
no more than 120 minutes (2 hours) of your time. The fNIRS will be used during the second session to record 
brain activity while you are being asked questions about your memory for the scenes presented in session 
one. The study will take place in a small, enclosed lab setting. You will not be contacted for any follow-up 
sessions related to this study.  
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
There are no known risks from participating in this study. On rare occasion people may experience mild 
emotional discomfort or mental fatigue during some of the tasks, but any negative reactions are expected to 
be mild and temporary. You will be wearing a neoprene headband that is used to measure brain activation. 
fNIRS is safe to use, however, the device uses class 2/3R lasers which can be harmful to one’s eyes if 
mishandled. The researcher has certified training to handle the device and will give you clear, explicit 
instructions before the device is switched on. To set up the headband, the researchers will have to touch your 
head and hair. You will be asked to sit as still as possible while wearing the headband. Some people may feel 
discomfort from the headband or from sitting in one position for an extended period. It is possible that some 
people may experience mild and transient anxiety, as the testing takes place in a small room with reduced 
lighting. If you feel uncomfortable answering any questions or performing any tasks, you can choose to 
discontinue that section of the study without penalty. If you feel the need to talk to anyone about your feelings 
or wish to seek assistance, you will be provided a list of resources you can contact in the letter of explanation, 
at the end of the study. 
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
There is no direct benefit to participating in this study. However, the information gained from the overall study 
may contribute to research around memory. You can also learn about optical imaging and attention. When 
the session is over, the purpose and hypotheses of the study will be described in more detail. 
 
COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION 
We will provide you with 3 bonus points on completion of the study, if you are enrolled in the Psychology 




point) and Part 2: memory test (1 points), separated by one week). An extra 0.5 points will be given after the 
commencement of each week, for a total of 3 bonus points.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
We guarantee that your participation in this study will be confidential. We will not reveal to anyone else that 
you took part in the study without your permission. Any information that can be identified with you will be stored 
securely in Dr. Abeare’s laboratory. On the completion of the study, any information identified with you will be 
removed from the study record. The audio recording will be stored securely, transcribed, and deleted on the 
completion of the study. After the study ends, a record of the bonus points will be kept for one year, at which 
time it will be destroyed. All de-identified data will be retained indefinitely. 
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
During the duration of your study appointment, you may withdraw without penalty. If you indicate that you 
would like to withdraw, we will ask if you are willing to explain why; you are not obligated to tell us your reason 
for withdrawing. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant 
doing so. You will receive 0.5 bonus points per half hour of time that you have spent in the study up to the 
time of withdrawal. Participant data can only be withdrawn up to 10 days after the completion of their study 
appointment.  
 
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS 
The results of the study will be posted to the University of Windsor REB website by August 2020 
(https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/research-result-summaries/).  
 
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA 
These data may be used in subsequent studies, in publications and in presentations.  
 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact:  Research Ethics Coordinator, 
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail:  
ethics@uwindsor.ca 
 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
I understand the information provided for the study Remembering Recorded Events as described herein. My 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study.  I have been given 
a copy of this form. 
 
______________________________________ 
Name of Participant 
 
 
______________________________________   ___________________ 





SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR. These are the terms under which I will conduct research. 
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